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IN PARTIAL PRAISE OF DILLON'S RULE, OR, CAN
PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY JUSTIFY LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAW?
CLAYTON P. GILLETTE*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Contemporary scholarship in local government law faces the difficult task of defining a role for individual municipalities in a world of
increasing local interdependence. For some, this regionalism has the unfortunate by-product of reducing opportunities for individuals to participate in political affairs or to share in the benefits of community identity. I
Others take a contrary tack, arguing that desirable advances in regional
coordination are frustrated by a legal regime that sanctions parochial local goals. 2 Each side of the debate, however, agrees on this much: the
current state of local government law, particularly those doctrines that
define the scope of local autonomy, are inadequate to the desired task.
For those who consider the locality as a focal point for public life within
which individuals can participate meaningfully in politics, legal doctrine
insufficiently promotes municipal initiative. 3 On this view, localities can
* Perre Bowen Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. Thanks for careful
readings and helpful comments are due to participants in faculty workshops at Boston University
School of Law and George Mason University Law School. Special thanks are due to Kathy Abrams,
Lynn Baker, Vicki Been, Jack Beermann, Richard Briffault, Joe Brodley, Ronald Cass, Douglas
Leslie, Larry Sager, Gary Schwartz, Ken Simons and Avi Soifer.
1. See Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1980); Ronald
R. Garet, Communalityand Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1001 (1983); Frank
Michelman, Conceptions ofDemocracy in American ConstitutionalArgument: Voting Rights, 41 FLA.
L. REV. 443 (1989); Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988).
2. The best statement of this position can be found in Richard Briffault, Our Localism (pts.
l&2), 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 346 (1990).
3. The possibility of the locality becoming a place for public debate has caused some to bemoan the failure of the founders to find a place for localities in the constitutional firmament. See
HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 235 (Penguin ed. 1977); James E. Herget, The Missing Power
of Local Governments: A Divergence Between Text and Practicein Our Early State Constitutions, 62
VA. L. REV. 999 (1976). On the Jeffersonian admonition to "turn the counties into wards," see
Clayton P. Gillette, Plebiscites, Participation, and Collective Action in Local Government Law, 86
MICH. L. REV. 930, 931 n.7 (1988).
Although some assume that local units will foster a spirit of communitarianism, that view is not
necessarily coextensive with the celebration of localism. A desire to provide a public place for deliberation is also consistent with a liberal individualism that seeks to provide opportunities for dispute
and exchange of ideas without any expectation or hope that a consensus will emerge, or even to
ensure the existence of private space, free from government or group intervention. See Amy Gutmann, Communitarian Criticsof Liberalism, 14 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 308 (1985); George Kateb, Democratic Individuality and the Meaning of Rights, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE 183-206
(Nancy Rosenblum ed., 1989).
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achieve their desired purpose only when empowered to engage in activities that permit pursuit of residents' interests. For those who fear the
capacity of localities to act parochially, however, those interests too readily ignore or offend the interests of nonresidents. For them, local governments should be constrained in their ability to do much more than
serve as administrative units for the implementation of policy decisions
made at a more centralized level of government. Hence, even the current
4
scope of local authority is threatening.
My concern in this article is with the underpinnings of current doctrine concerning local autonomy. Debates over issues such as home rule
and the proper interpretation of municipal authority cannot rationally be
resolved unless we have some view of the reasons for exercising or withholding those powers. Compatible with all sides of the debate over the
proper scope of local autonomy, however, is the view that municipalities,
at a minimum, should provide those local public goods and services preferred by their constituents. This objective certainly incorporates the
view that local governments are administrative economic units; indeed,
those who hold this view may consider provision of public goods to be
the only task suitable to localities. 5 But satisfaction of local preferences
is equally compatible with the conception of local government as a focal
point for public discourse. If individuals were unable to realize the objectives that emerge from public debate (to attain the type of community
that emanates from discussion), the content of that debate would soon
become purely academic and would be unlikely to sustain the robustness
that advocates claim for it. At the same time, the focus on local public
goods, by definition, avoids the problem of externalities that lead some to
call for constraints on local autonomy.
In this Article, I suggest that one particular doctrine of local government law that initially appears inconsistent with liberal conceptions of
local autonomy may actually increase the likelihood that a given locality
will supply those goods and services preferred by its residents. I argue
that the doctrine at issue, Dillon's Rule, can best be understood and justified as a judicial check on local tendencies to cater to special interests at
the expense of other groups within the locality. For those who consider
local autonomy to be unnecessarily constrained, Dillon's Rule is anath4. The excellent attack on "localism" by Richard Briffault focuses primarily on the capacity of
localities to engage in activities that generate adverse effects outside the jurisdiction. See Briffault,
supra note 2.
5. See GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE TENABLE RANGE OF FUNCTIONS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
in JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, FEDERAL EXPENDITURE POLICY FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND
STABILITY,

85th Cong., 1st Sess. 213 (Joint Comm. Print 1957).
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ema. If my view of the Rule is correct, however, then Dillon's Rule may
be vital in ensuring that localities satisfy the objectives of their residents.
Typically, special interests will constitute a minority of the locality, so
that satisfaction of their demands is likely to deviate from the aggregate
preferences of the community. If Dillon's Rule creates an obstacle for
these interests, therefore, it may enhance the ability of a majority of municipal residents to achieve their preferences. 6 Nor is there anything implicit in Dillon's Rule that requires that those preferences be taken as
given; the Rule does nothing to frustrate and perhaps provides some
mechanism to achieve informed preferences that presumably evolve from
robust public debate. Indeed, my strongest claim is that, given the current structure of local decision-making, informed residents would prefer
the doctrine that has emerged.
I propose to reinforce my thesis with learning from the literature of
public choice. Nevertheless, I cannot claim that public choice theory
leads inexorably to my conclusion. Public choice theory makes two related predictions that can explain the propriety of Dillon's Rule. The
first is that political officials and their constituents will tend to make decisions that advance their own personal welfare, even when doing so comes
at the expense of the community's general welfare. 7 This is not to say
that either public officials or their constituents are devoid of personal
ideology, or are oblivious to any conception of the public interest. 8 It is
to say that personal interests are an important variable in the positions
taken by local officials and constituents regarding the allocation of municipal resources. The second prediction is that localities are particularly
susceptible to the political alliances that form as a result of economic
6. Although I have stated in the text that the primary justification of Dillon's Rule is to constrain the capacities of minority interests, it is important to recognize that "special interests" may
occasionally coincide with the interests of the majority. In this case, it is difficult to separate
majoritarian interests from the aggregate preferences of the community, a point made effectively by
Richard Briffault in his comments at the Conference at which this paper was presented. This situation may give rise to fear that the majority will run roughshod over the minority, a concern for "raw
majoritarianism." Although my immediate concern with Dillon's Rule lies in its ability to prevent
capture of the local legislative process by minority interests, I will argue, particularly with respect to
impact fees, that Dillon's Rule and related doctrines of local government law also serve to counter
raw majoritarianism by requiring a process in which adversely affected minorities are permitted to
express their views. See text accompanying notes 110-33, infra. This process may frustrate majority
will in some sense, but does so only by requiring that the majority consider alternative interests
before making an ultimate decision, not by replacing majority rule with some other decision-making

process.
7. I recognize the difficulty of providing any concrete meaning to the concept of "general
welfare" or "public interest." I do not propose to define these phrases, but to suggest that action in
the name of the general welfare takes into account the interests of diverse groups, considers longterm as well as short-term effects, and is not necessarily coextensive with majority views.
8. See, e.g., Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, The Apparent Ideological Behavior of Legislators: Testing for Principal-Agent Slack in Political Institutions, 33 J.L. & ECON. 103 (1990).
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interests, as local governance heightens both opportunities for the formation of some groups and opportunities for free riding among those not
easily organized. The result of these predictions is that rent-seeking behavior is possible and that Dillon's Rule is a potential remedy.
At the same time, my thesis is inconsistent with other predictions
from public choice. Public choice theory, at least in its strongest form,
suggests that law is a tool of special interests able to capture the attentions (and votes) of lawmakers, who themselves engage in efforts to collect rents from those most willing and able to pay for government
largesse. This view of legal process has led to the complaint that public
choice theory is antidemocratic, or at least produces an unattractive picture of government through democratic representation. 9 Thus, if Dillon's Rule were embodied in a statute, one might explain it as a
legislative attempt to exact rents from localities that seek to exercise authority. But public choice theory need not be so negative. By delineating
the conditions in which special interests are most likely to succeed, it
may also predict the circumstances in which legal intervention to prevent
domination by a particular interest group is most essential. The strongest forms of public choice, of course, would deny the possibility of such
publicly interested intervention. Indeed, acceptance of the premises of
public choice requires some explanation of how and why a publicly interested coalition would arise to create legal obstacles for the favored interest group. Dillon's Rule may less readily be classified in this manner.
First, it is a judicial rule, and the rents that judges can obtain through its
implementation are less obvious. Second, few would suggest that no
legal doctrines serve the public interest. It must be the case, then, that
some mechanism motivates the occasional legal doctrines inhibiting the
type of laws that the public choice literature finds so prevalent and unpalatable. In this Article, I suggest that the desire to create barriers to
rent-seeking behavior best explains the existence and application of Dillon's Rule. At the end of the Article, I suggest that the desire to impede
government behavior that would be predicted by public choice also explains some related doctrines that affect the scope of municipal
autonomy. to
9. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Democracy and Disgust. Reflections on Public Choice, 65 CHI.KENT L. REV. 161 (1989).

10. Since I am concerned with the use of public choice to predict failures of the democratic
process, it may be useful to determine whether the legal responses to those failures I discuss fit with
those conditions in which public choice theorists speculate public interest might be served. At first
glance, it may appear that no such fit exists. Jonathan Macey, for instance, has suggested that public
interest may be vindicated during a constitutional moment. See Jonathan R. Macey, Competing
Economic Views of the Constitution, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50 (1987). If this is true, then one
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II.

DILLON'S RULE AND THE SCOPE OF LOCAL AUTONOMY

Dillon's Rule is perhaps the best known doctrine of local government law. As formulated by its author-judge and treatise writer John
F. Dillon-the doctrine t I limits localities to exercise of those powers expressly delegated to them by the state legislature or necessary to implement or necessarily implied from express legislative grants.' 2 Any
doubts about the validity of the local initiative are to be resolved against
exercise of the power. The Rule therefore embodies a vision of localities
as creatures of the legislature that are entitled to no rights greater than or
independent of those of the state. Notwithstanding some subsequent liberalization by its author, 13 most judicial statements of the rule remain
true to its original expression.
Dillon dedicated precious little space to justifying his view of local
subservience. The relationship between locality and state implicit in the
Rule assumes an immutable and incontestable principle of positive law
that reflects the state's position as "creator" of its political subdivisions
and for which justification would be superfluous. Confirmation of the
Rule's propriety lay in the circumstances out of which it arose. In the
absence of legal constraints, municipalities had incurred substantial debts
for the questionable public function of financing railroad companies and
other public improvements that subsequently failed, leaving taxpayers in
fiscal straits. 14 Dillon, as judge and commentator, had railed (pun inmight look to see whether state constitutions embody the rule of law that I argue herein serves public
interest. Even a cursory examination of state constitutions reveals that they tend to embody home
rule, a doctrine contrary to Dillon's Rule. Nevertheless, this proves little in the current context.
These provisions were added as state constitutions were revised, a process quite different from the
creation of a nation and initial constitution with which Macey is concerned. Indeed, one may argue
that home rule was inserted into state constitutions at the behest of special interest groups (large
cities), and thus illustrates the type of legislation with which public choice theory is most concerned.
Additionally, Macey seems concerned with the federal constitutional process, rather than with the
more frequent and less definitional process of drafting, amending, or revising a state constitution.
11. The doctrine is perhaps better cast as a rule of statutory construction. See FRANK
MICHELMAN & TERRANCE SANDALOW, GOVERNMENT IN URBAN AREAS 254-55 (1970).
12. That part of Dillon's Rule most frequently cited reads:

It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipalcorporationpossesses
and can exercise the following powers, and no others: First, those granted in express words;
second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted;
third, those essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of the
corporation, not simply convenient, but indispensable.
I JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 448-49 (5th ed.
1911).
13. Compare I JOHN F. DILLON, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 55 (1st ed. 1873)
with

1 JOHN

F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §

237-39

(5th ed. 1911).

14. See Joan C. Williams, The ConstitutionalVulnerability ofAmerican Local Government: The
Politics of City Status in American Law, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 83, 92-97 [hereinafter Williams, Constitutional Vulnerability]; Joan C. Williams, The Invention of the Municipal Corporation:A Case Study in
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tended) against these developments. 15 Dillon's Rule, therefore, became a
weapon in the battle against fiscal overextension and its more vicious
counterpart, municipal corruption. 16 Fiscal impropriety did not result
simply from banal overconfidence in the capacity of entrepreneurs to enhance the commercial attractiveness of a city; it was also the stepchild of
immorality in local government, evidenced by outright bribery; the creation of machine politics; and, for Dillon, local government's disregard for
private property that would otherwise have created a barrier against gov7
ernment intervention. 1
The oft-told story of scholarly reactions that sought a right of selfgovernment for localities and ultimately generated the home rule movement need not be repeated here.' 8 It is sufficient to note that, notwithstanding some recent doubt expressed about its continuing vitality,19
Dillon's Rule remains a significant doctrine in decisions about the exercise of local power. Within the decade, courts have invoked the doctrine
of limited municipal powers to achieve results as widespread as invalidation of municipal contracts to purchase energy capacity in a decision that
led to the largest default of municipal bonds in history, 20 nullification of
an ordinance requiring bottle deposits, 2' and invalidation of municipal
Legal Change, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 437 (1985). The claim that follows from this history is that
decisions concerning local fiscal stability had to be made at a more centralized level of government,
i.e., by the state. This traditional account from Dillon's laissez-faire era ignores the fact that during
the first half of the eighteenth century, states had assumed similar obligations with similar results
when the Panic of 1837 forced default on borrowings for internal improvements. See ALBERT M.
HILLHOUSE, MUNICIPAL BONDS: A CENTURY OF EXPERIENCE 34 (1936). See generally, WILLIAM
A. ScoTT, THE REPUDIATION OF STATE DEBTS (1893).
15. See, e.g., Hanson v. Vernon, 27 Iowa 28 (1869); John F. Dillon, The Law of Municipal
Bonds, 2 (N.S.) S. L. Rev. 437, 444 (1876).
16. See Frug, supra note 1,at 1110-11; Williams, Constitutional Vulnerability, supra note 14, at
100.
17. HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORATION OF

THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730-1870 222-23, 261-62 (1983). The view of private property as a bulwark against government excess is not limited to those who would constrain
the reach of local government. Hannah Arendt's celebration of the American Constitution recognizes "respect for private property" as the traditional remedy against "the tendency of public power
to expand and to trespass upon private interests." See ARENDT, supra note 3, at 252. Arendt is not
advocating a libertarian policy, however. She simultaneously feared the possibility that pursuit of
private interests could reduce individual concern with the public realm. Her remedy was the elevation of the public realm at the local level, the only level in which individuals could have the opportunity "of being republicans and of acting as citizens." Id. at 253.
18. See Howard L. McBain, The Doctrine ofan Inherent Right of Local Self-Government (pts. 1
& 2), 16 COLUM. L. REV. 190, 299 (1916).
19. Carol Rose has suggested, for instance, that zoning powers granted to localities after Euclid
effectively eviscerated the doctrine of narrow construction of municipal power. See Carol M. Rose,
The Ancient Constitution vw the FederalistEmpire: Anti-Federalism from the Attack on "Monarchism" to Modern Localism, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 74, 99 (1989).
20. Chemical Bank v. Washington Public Power Supply Sys., 666 P.2d 329 (Wash. 1983), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1065, 1075 (1985).
21. Tabler v. Board of Supervisors, 269 S.E.2d 358 (Va. 1980).
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restrictions on the sale of condominium units.22 Thus, even if the Rule
had its birth in local attempts to interfere with private property, it has
23
matured in areas that include traditional local functions.
Against this historical background, contemporary legal scholarship
has had little patience for Dillon's Rule or the costs it imposes on localities before they can legislate in a novel area. Instead, the doctrine is
usually presented as a cause of mischief whereby judicial bias is substi24
tuted for principled decision about the scope of the local initiative.
Questions about the desirability of the Rule begin with comparison to
analogous legal doctrines employed to interpret the powers of private
corporations. Like municipal corporations, private corporations are
creatures of legislative charter. The by-laws that directors enact pursuant to legislative enabling acts are the functional equivalent of municipal
ordinances enacted by officials pursuant to municipal charter or statute.
Nevertheless, the standard principle of statutory construction with respect to private corporations is one of broad interpretation, so that findings of ultra vires actions by these entities are infrequent. 2 5 Moreover,
black letter law dictates that any ambiguity concerning corporate powers
is to be resolved in favor of the exercise of power. How, then, can one
justify the opposite rule for municipal corporations? The simple answer
22. Steinbergh v. Rent Control Bd. of Cambridge, 546 N.E.2d 169 (Mass. 1989).
23. See also Brooks v. City of Benton, 826 S.W.2d 259 (Ark. 1992). Frug argues that the Rule
had its source in the concern to insulate private property from government interference. See Frug,
supra note 1, at 1109-13. One might argue that the Rule should have continued vitality where
localities are involved in proprietary activities that are more likely to implicate private property, but
less effect where traditional government activities are involved. Given the ability of courts to differ
over whether a particular function is proprietary or governmental, see id. at 1140 n.359, the continuing demise of the distinction is fortunate and should not be disrupted. See Janice C. Griffith, Local
Government Contracts: Escaping From the Governmental/ProprietaryMaze, 75 IOWA L. REV. 277
(1990). Furthermore, there is little reason to believe that governments are more likely to act arbitrarily or improperly when their conduct concerns a "private" rather than a "public" function.
Indeed, just the opposite may be the case. When government adversely affects private property, at
least one person, the property owner, will generally have a sufficiently intense interest to object.
Where public property is at issue, interests may be sufficiently diffuse that it is not worth any one
party's while to intervene, notwithstanding the aggregate loss to the community.
24. See Note, Dillon's Rule: The Case for Reform, 68 VA. L. REV. 693 (1982). Even Professor
Briffault, who presumably would prefer to constrain municipal authority, does not explicitly endorse
Dillon's Rule as a means to that end.
25. The general rule for interpretation of the authority of private corporations provides:
In determining the powers of a corporation, a fair and reasonable construction should
be given to the laws or charter provisions under which such powers are claimed ... [and]
where the power exercised is not wholly inconsistent with the powers granted or with the
object or purpose of the corporation, and the power has been exercised for a long period of
time, any doubt as to the construction of a grant of power should be resolved in favor of the
corporation.
WILLIAM M.

FLETCHER, CYCLOPAEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2483 (Perm.

Ed. 1989 Rev. Vol.). It may be, or course, that both should be subject to the doctrines currently
applicable to localities. Later in this Article, however, I will suggest a justification for the
distinction.
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that municipal corporations must be restrained because of the inherent
power of government simply cannot pass muster in a period when private
corporations take on responsibilities as important as those of governments in the delivery of essential services. That an investor-owned electric utility or water company should be subject to less rigorous
constraints than a municipally owned electric light plant can be explained formalistically, but not justified, on the basis of the governmental
nature of the provider. The capacity of a private telephone company or
automobile manufacturer to affect the quality of life through corporate
decision making is not apparently less than that of a government. In a
time of increasing privatization of government functions, the distinction
26
increasingly rings hollow.
Questions about Dillon's Rule become more pronounced on the understanding that its primary effect is to shift the decision about the scope
of local authority from political institutions, the city council or state legislature, to the courts.2 7 Judges determine whether an express grant of
power includes the activity at issue in a particular case. Judges decide
whether a legislative grant of power "necessarily" implies the authority
that the locality seeks to exercise. The consequence is subordination of
local decision making to other institutions and a correlative decline in
municipal autonomy, political participation, and self-determination by
residents. The inherent vagueness of the standard provides courts with
the ability to modify or retard the local agenda, or to require localities to
seek specific enabling acts from the state. A rule that limits local initiative, therefore, implies that local constituents cannot be trusted to sort
out those policies that are and are not detrimental to the locality, while
shareholders of private corporations can best evaluate what serves their
financial welfare. Unlike the corporate context, the political process by
which local choices might be made is subordinated to a non-market selection mechanism, i.e., a judicial arbiter.
Greater tolerance for the Rule might exist if there were a sense that,
once placed in judicial hands, interpretation of the standard had evolved
into a coherent, predictable view of local powers. Were this the case,
local officials and residents might at least pursue political activity in areas
clearly within local jurisdiction. Alternatively, residents might come to
26. See Ronald A. Cass, Privatization: Politics, Law, and Theory, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 449
(1988). On the public/private distinction, see Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519 (1982).
27. Williams, Constitutional Vulnerability, supra note 14, at 99-100; HARTOG, supra note 17, at
224. This, of course, was the intended consequence of the Rule, as judges saw themselves as the
barrier between local misuse of authority and the protection of individual rights. See id. at 222-23.
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believe that judges were acting properly, if paternalistically, in their (the
residents') interests. But commentators on local government purport to
discern just the opposite of a sustained, lucid view of the Rule's application. 28 The uncertainty the Rule is thought to engender is evident in the
textbook staple used to introduce students to it, Early Estates v. Housing
Board of Review of Providence.29 That case illustrates the nuisance that
judicial intervention can work. In Early Estates, the Supreme Court of
Rhode Island was asked to consider whether the city council of Providence had the authority to include two requirements in a minimum standards housing ordinance. The ordinance had been passed pursuant to a
state statute authorizing the city to establish minimum standards for
housing "essential to the protection of the public health, safety, morals
and general welfare," and to enact minimum standards deemed necessary
to make dwellings "safe, sanitary and fit for human habitation." One of
the challenged provisions of the ordinance required multi-family dwellings to have lighting in public spaces; the other required the same dwellings to be connected to hot water lines. In an opinion as conclusory as it
is mystifying, a majority of the court held that the quoted language in the
statute "clearly intended to vest the council with power to require hallway lights."' 30 The majority interpreted the same statute, however, to
contain no authority for a municipality to enact hot water requirements.
In each case, the court reached its decision on an application of Dillon's
Rule.
The popular pedagogical use of this contradictory set of conclusions
suggests that the case stands as evidence of such pervasive judicial mischief as to render the Rule congenitally inappropriate. My objective is to
demonstrate instead that Dillon's Rule plays an important function in
ensuring appropriate decision making at the local level. What makes the
doctrine inappropriate in the Rhode Island case, I contend, is not simply
28. See MICHELMAN & SANDALOW, supra note 11, at 254.
29. 174 A.2d 117 (R.I. 1961). Apparently no set of materials in local government law can be
considered complete without Early Estates. See MICHELMAN & SANDALOW, supra note 11, at 277;
GERALD FRUG, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 64 (1988); DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 93 (3d ed. 1980).
30. 174 A.2d at 118. The full sentence reads: "The use of such language [by the legislature]
makes it abundantly clear that the legislature clearly intended to vest the council with power to
require hallway lights as a safety measure." I submit that when a court uses a form of the term
"clear" to describe legislative intent, there is a rebuttable presumption that the court has no support
for its position; but that when a court uses a form of the term "clear" twice in one sentence to
describe legislative intent, there is an irrebuttable presumption that the court has no support for its
position.
The Rhode Island legislature effectively overturned the decision in Early Estates the following
year. 1962 R.I. Pub. Laws 122 expressly permitted minimum standards under local housing code
ordinances to require the installation of facilities to heat hot water.
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inconsistency in application (a judicial trait hardly unique to this rule of
statutory construction 3 ), but the absence of those factors that otherwise
render local decision-making suspect.
III.

THE CONDITIONS FOR LOCAL AUTONOMY

In the face of these criticisms-inconsistency with analogous legal
principles, shifting authority away from autonomous localities, and inherent ambiguity-what justifications could exist for narrow construction of municipal initiative power? 32 In this part, I wish to elaborate a
justification based on an argument that residents of a locality would prefer Dillon's Rule under a discrete set of circumstances where its application increases the probability of receiving a mutually agreeable package
of local goods and services. I begin with an attempt to indicate the circumstances under which restrictions on local autonomy are superfluous.
Given the assumption that the primary function of localities is to provide
local goods and services for constituents, those ideal circumstances
would obtain when the package of local public goods and services provided in each locality satisfies the preferences of local residents. 33 When
that condition exists, there seems to be little reason to limit the authority
of local governments, as they are acting in the desired manner, even
without legal intervention.
31. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory ofAppellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950).
32. One rationale for the Rule seems implicit in Mill's observation that local officials are of
"lower average of capacities," "almost certain to be of a much lower grade of intelligence and knowledge" than officials of the central government, and "accountable to, an inferior public opinion."
JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 222-24 (Currin V.
Shields ed., 1958). If our quest is for sophisticated, intelligent decision making, then the assumption
that local officials are generally inadequate to the task augurs for restricting the scope of their authority. Dennis Thompson refers to this attitude as evidence of Mill's concern for the competence of
government officials. See DENNIS F. THOMPSON, JOHN STUART MILL AND REPRESENTATIVE

GOVERNMENT 126-35 (1976). But even Mill is ambivalent in his analysis of the "comparative position of the central and the local authorities, as to capacity for the work, and security against negligence or abuse." MILL, supra, at 224. Thus, Mill notes that, even as local residents have an inferior
knowledge of "the principles of administration," they have "a far more direct interest in the result"
and thus are likely to be more watchful of their officials. Id. Mill seems to imply that residents at
the local level are more likely to overcome the free rider problem due to their comparatively small
numbers. If we understand Mill to be seeking allocation of government power in a manner that
permits both competent administration and opportunities for personal development where the adverse effects of learning slowly are not imposed externally, local activity seems appropriate within a
range where the intense interests of constituents will induce and enable them to monitor the implementation of centrally designed programs. Hence, Thompson suggests that Mill believed that localities were capable of achieving an appropriate balance of competence and participation and thus
avoided unqualified endorsement of centralization. See THOMPSON, supra, at 130-31.
33. As indicated above, this objective may be intended either as an end unto itself or as a means
to achieving some further end (such as allowing citizens to engage in discourse about the selection
and allocation of goods provided, or having sufficient goods provided to contemplate the good life).
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Once these ideal conditions are recognized, they can be compared to
the more realistic state of affairs under which localities actually operate.
Should absence of the ideal conditions bring about a situation in which
the package of local public goods fails to satisfy constituent preferences,
some legal constraints on local autonomy may be appropriate to reduce
or eliminate the diversion from the ideal. Given the contractarian nature
of the argument, the clearest case of a desirable constraint on local autonomy exists where all residents would agree to it. My argument, therefore, ultimately seeks to demonstrate that rational residents would prefer
34
a legal principle such as Dillon's Rule.
The polar case for untrammelled local autonomy seems subsumed in
Charles Tiebout's exploration of the allocation of local goods and services. 35 In Tiebout's idealized model, each locality provides a package of
local public goods consistent with the preferences of its residents (consumer-voters). 36 Residents whose preferences remain unsatisfied by a
particular locality's package of goods and services would (costlessly)
move. (I address later the possibility that disgruntled residents might
also seek to convince their neighbors or officials to adjust the package to
one consistent with their own preferences.) Escape from undesirable
packages of goods and services is feasible as a result of two explicit characteristics of the Tiebout model: absence of externalities and mobility of
residents.
The assumption that externalities do not exist in the Tiebout world
is consistent with Mill's limitation of the proper arena of local autonomy
to matters "purely local."' 37 The willingness of localities to impose burdens on neighbors who have no representation in the decision has generated the most bitter attacks on local exercises of power. 38 The capacity
of localities to engage in exclusionary zoning, to draw boundaries, and to
pollute all illustrate that localities can exercise their considerable authority to achieve narrow parochial objectives at the expense of nonconstituents. By definition, intramural delivery of goods and services neither
confers substantial benefits nor imposes substantial costs on nonresidents. Hence, in the Tiebout world of no externalities, nonresidents need
34. On contractarian arguments generally, see GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN,
THE REASON OF RULES 19-33 (1985). For a view that arguments resting on hypothetical consent

must ultimately rely on the justification of the goods that parties are said to desire in the hypothetical
contract, see DAVID SCHMIDTZ, THE LIMITS OF GOVERNMENT 7-10 (1991).

35.
36.
Delivery
37.
38.

Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
I have previously elaborated this view in Clayton P. Gillette, Equality and Variety in the
of Municipal Services, 100 HARV. L. REV. 946 (1987) (book review).
See MILL, supra note 32, at 222.
See Briffault, supra note 2.
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no protection from offensive local activity and individuals within a locality can avoid all costs of unwanted services through emigration.
In such a world, legal restrictions on municipal autonomy would be
superfluous. Localities that sought to exercise broad initiative power to
perform novel functions would presumably attract residents partial to
those functions without adversely affecting those who wished to eschew
them. 39 Performance of a function that imposed substantial costs on residents without returning offsetting benefits would presumably be corrected either through electoral reform or by migration as exiting
residents signalled their displeasure without governmental intervention.
Indeed, this argument meets even the occasional argument that Dillon's
Rule was articulated as an effort to forestall local government interference with private property. 4° A more autonomous local government
structure would permit localities so inclined to condemn or regulate private property and to invite those parties least receptive to such intervention to emigrate. What is important is that the combination of
"markets" for residents and "deliberation" within any particular locality
about the desired service package can produce an optimal allocation of
resources within localities of optimal size without government intervention (except in the creation of the institutions necessary for decision mak4
ing by consumer-voters). '

Within the Tiebout model, any justification for Dillon's Rule that is
itself based on externalities also evaporates. Because local functions generate no external effects, no restriction on the local initiative is necessary
to protect nonresidents. Nor would legal constraints or incentives be
necessary to accomplish greater levels of participation or more powerful
localities. Instead, residents who sought additional opportunities for participation would migrate to those localities that offered them. Town
meeting forms of governance would freely compete with more bureau42
cratic or hierarchical forms.

39. Tiebout also assumes a sufficient number of localities to accommodate disgruntled
emigrants. See Tiebout, supra note 35, at 419.
40. See Williams, ConstitutionalVulnerability, supra note 14, at 97.
41. The capacity of individuals to migrate may also interfere with optimal allocation of resources, as individuals will decide whether or not to move based on a consideration of personal costs
and benefits rather than social ones. The result may be that it is worthwhile for an individual to
move from jurisdiction A to jurisdiction B, even though it produces congestion in the latter. This
problem requires redress at a centralized level. See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 157-

63 (1989); James Buchanan & Charles Goetz, Efficiency Limits of Fiscal Mobility: An Assessment of
the Tiebout Model, I J. PUB. ECON. 25 (1972).
42. One might imagine that this choice would not satisfy the objectives of those who view
localities as an appropriate forum for political activity because individuals who had not previously
participated could fail to appreciate the benefits of participation and ignorantly choose a hierarchical
form of local government when, if informed, they would prefer a participatory one.

1991]

DILLON'S RULE

Outside the Tiebout world of no externalities, however, some constraints on local power are necessary to prevent strategic local behavior.
One locality may affect others by direct regulation 4 3 or by engaging in
activities, such as polluting, that significantly limit the choices of nonresidents. The desire to control externalities, therefore, may explain a
great deal of otherwise incoherent doctrine about local government
law. 44 Nevertheless, the failure to eliminate external effects does not explain-and certainly does not justify-Dillon's Rule. First, the Rule
does not ensure that localities will be unable to impose substantial burdens on nonresidents. The Rule does not prohibit the exercise of municipal power; it only requires that localities first seek permission from the
state legislature. Where benefits will be concentrated within the proposing locality, and burdens will be distributed diffusely throughout much of
the state, the intense interests of the locality may be sufficient to overcome any resistance from those burdened. While representatives of even
minutely burdened areas might be expected to oppose the proposal from
which they receive no benefit, the possibility of logrolling suggests that
even these representatives could be persuaded to vote in favor of the proposal if they can trade for a bill that favors their constituents, as long as
those benefits outweigh perceived losses from support of the first locality's proposal. 4 5 Thus, to the extent that Dillon's Rule requires localities
43. See, e.g., Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60 (1978).
44. Take, for example, the issue of the scope of judicial review of incorporation decisions. In
virtually all jurisdictions, municipalities become incorporated by following statutory standards. The
relevant standards, however, vary widely from state to state. In some jurisdictions, the requirements
for incorporation create ephemeral standards such as the existence of a "community." See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE § 11-41-1 (1989), which allows incorporation by "a body of citizens whose residences
are contiguous to and all of which form a homogeneous settlement or community." Elsewhere,
statutes dictate a relatively specific litany of factors that must be considered before incorporation can
occur. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 414.02 (West 1987 & 1991 Supp.). In each case, the ultimate
question remains who is to decide whether the legislative standard has been satisfied. Absent concern about external effects, however, that inquiry seems unnecessary; petitioners presumably sought
incorporation because they believed that incorporation meets their needs. Typically, the reason that
courts use to express concern about proposed incorporations has to do with the fear that incorporation will impose substantial externalities on those areas outside the proposed municipality. These
externalities might take the form of a reduced tax base for surrounding unincorporated areas, see
Cottonwood City Electors v. Salt Lake County Bd. of Comm'rs, 499 P.2d 270 (Utah 1972); of physical isolation as new boundary lines divide neighborhoods, see In re Incorporation of the Borough of
Glen Mills, 558 A.2d 592 (Pa. Commw. Ct.), appeal denied, 567 A. 2d 655 (Pa. 1989); or of the
omission of areas equally in need of services as those included in the incorporated municipality, see
Daniel R. Mandelker, Standardsfor Municipal Incorporationson the Urban Fringe, 36 TEX. L. REV.
271, 292-94 (1958). It is unlikely that the decision of incorporators will consider the costs that
incorporation will impose on those who remain outside. Delegation of the decision to the broader
body, e.g., a court, is more likely to generate a process that encompasses both costs and benefits of
the proposed incorporation.
45. Logrolling may enable representatives of one locality to obtain support for legislation particularly favorable to it by agreeing to vote for legislation favored by representatives of other localities, even though each such enactment would generate aggregate costs in excess of social gains. I
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to appeal to the state legislature, the effect may be to foster trading external burdens at the state level rather than a net diminution of negative
spillovers.

46

More importantly, however, the presence of externalities can neither
explain nor justify Dillon's Rule, because activities that generate significant spillovers do not fall within the domain covered by the Rule in the
first place. Dillon's Rule does not attempt to define those activities that
are or are not within the scope of local competence. Rather, it requires
that, even for activities deemed properly within the local realm under
some independent metric, the locality must additionally secure legislative
authorization. What takes them outside the realm of local concern, however, is the very fact that they produce substantial spillovers. Thus, no
formulation of Dillon's Rule is necessary to bar one locality from imposing taxes on another or from zoning or condemning property within another jurisdiction.4 7 Of course, it is likely that an exercise of local
authority that imposed substantial externalities would properly be addressed at a more centralized level, such as the legislative. Thus, the
search for a proper decision maker in such a case could well lead to results consistent with Dillon's Rule. Nevertheless, impositions of external
burdens do not constitute the cases that have given rise to judicial invocation of the Rule. 48 Indeed, even in home rule jurisdictions that grant
localities substantial initiative power within a particular realm of "municipal affairs," we might be willing to preclude local decision making
that adversely affected neighboring jurisdictions. 49 Finally, at the very
have suggested elsewhere that the concern for logrolling may be viewed as a justification for state
constitutional restrictions on "special legislation," i.e., legislation that affects only a limited number
of localities. See Gillette, supra note 3, at 970-71.
46. This form of the Tragedy of the Commons may support a general skepticism about logrolling. See MUELLER, supra note 41, at 82-86.
47. This is not to say that a legislature might not delegate such powers to a locality. See, e.g.,
John M. Payne, Intergovernmental Condemnation as a Problem in Public Finance, 61 TEX. L. REV.
949 (1983). It is only to say that the requirement for such extraordinary delegation is not dependent
on Dillon's Rule, but on recognition that regional issues are sometimes best addressed by having one
locality serve as regional decision maker.
48. See, e.g., Jachimek v. Superior Court in and for County of Maricopa, 819 P.2d 487 (Ariz.
1991) (invalidating local requirement for use permit in areas otherwise zoned in conformity with
state law); State v. City of Orlando, 576 So. 2d 1315 (Fla. 1991) (invalidating municipal revenue
bond issue); City of Richmond v. Confrere Club, 387 S.E.2d 471 (Va. 1990) (city could not enact
ordinance delegating authority to suspend bingo and raffle permits); Resource Conservation Management, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors of Prince William County, 380 S.E.2d 879 (Va. 1989) (upholding ordinance to prohibit debris landfill). One recent invocation of Dillon's Rule precluded the
imposition of external benefits. See Watauga County Bd. of Educ. v. Town of Boone, 416 S.E. 2d
411 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992). Courts, however, have expressed a Dillon's-Rule unwillingness to permit
extraterritorial zoning without explicit legislative authority. See, e.g., Dougherty County v. Burt,
308 S.E.2d 395 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983).
49. This is a relatively simplified view of a complex topic, i.e., the scope of home rule. See, e.g.,
De Fazio v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 679 P.2d 1316 (Or. 1984). Home rule jurisdictions
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most, an externalities explanation for Dillon's Rule would justify restrictions only on those exercises of power that generated substantial negative
spillovers. For cases of "business purely local" that constitute the great
majority of Dillon's Rule issues, 50 there would be little reason for state or
judicial intervention. In the absence of externalities, the only negative
effects that local officials could produce would affect their own constituents. Should that occur, the political process should be a sufficient
source of remedy.
Unless, of course, the local political process is subject to its own
failures that impede-within the locality-the capacity of individuals to
obtain their preferred goods and services. Tiebout defines away this possibility with his second assumption-that his actors are perfectly mobile. 5 1 Tiebout's residents live on dividend income and thus are not tied
to localities by employment or other fiscal and physical constraints
(although social and psychic ties are not explicitly addressed in the
model). The result, again, is that they can vote with their feet should
local officials be insufficiently attentive to constituent preferences.
Where mobility is complete, politics are unnecessary to resolve issues of allocation. 52 Thus, the capacity to gravitate to more congenial
jurisdictions reinforces the impropriety of placing legal limits on local
authority. But, as in the case of externalities, once we move outside the
Tiebout world, the need for restrictions on local autonomy potentially
arises, this time to compensate for the lack of perfect mobility. 53 I say
"potentially" because, even in the absence of the ability to exit, there may
may figure more prominently in the debate about local autonomy today because major cities tend to
enjoy home rule rather than be subject to Dillon's Rule. At the same time, the larger size of home
rule localities tends to reduce the problems of forming multiple interest groups that I argue below
undergirds the justification for Dillon's Rule. Non-home rule localities tend to be relatively small
and hence the jurisdictions in which the concerns I express about reputation, repeat play, and collective action are likely to have greatest force.
50. That intramural disputes constitute the majority of cases is important if the objective is to
create a default rule for municipal authority in order to avoid judicial investigation into the degree of
externalities in any given case. The desire to ignore ad hoc investigation is appropriate to reduce
administrative costs or judicial error. But the default rule would presumably reflect the situation
that arises in the majority of cases likely to be in dispute. If the majority of cases involve minimal
externalities, then, even if it otherwise might be appropriate to limit local authority where externalities do exist, a default rule that permitted local autonomy would be proper.
51. Tiebout also assumes a sufficient number of localities to make the possibility of migration to
one more consonant with personal preferences a viable option.
52. See Robert Inman & Daniel Rubinfeld, A FederalistFiscal Constitutionfor an Imperfect
World: Lessonsfrom the United States, in FEDERALISM: STUDIES IN HISTORY, LAW AND POLICY
(Harry Scheiber ed., 1988).
53. Even if opportunities for exit from the locality are limited, they will likely exceed opportunities for interstate or international movement. Thus, one would expect to see substitutes for exit
used increasingly as the level of government against which residents have complaints becomes more
centralized.
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be more effective remedies than legal intervention to the problem of unsatisfied preferences. Indeed, once we relax the assumption that mobility
is costless, exit may be disfavored even by those who are relatively mobile
if some less costly alternative for achieving preferences is available. It is
to this end that Albert Hirschman suggested that voice might be an alternative to exit.5 4 Where mobility is costly, the introduction of politics to

change the status quo, or to resist change advocated by others, would
seem appropriate. Were all those interested in a particular outcome willing to express their views in a manner that revealed their true intensity,
we would expect a signalling process, deliberation and compromise, and
hence an ultimate outcome that approximates (if not duplicates) results
that could be obtained through perfect mobility. 55 The two processes
would deviate substantially only where those who lost the debate on an
issue would have exited, but fail to do so because the costs of mobility are
too high. 56 As long as the voice option remains a substantial, if imperfect, substitute for full mobility, however, lack of mobility alone cannot
serve as a justification for Dillon's Rule in intramural affairs. (Indeed,
under the communitarian view of local government, perfect mobilityfar from providing the benefits inherent in the Tiebout world-is less
desirable than the participation-fostering effects of relative immobility,
since loyally remaining in the locality and attempting to convince others
to change or reaching common ground is superior to individualistic retreat.5 7) If the participatory option worked as well outside the Tiebout
world as exit works within, Dillon's Rule would again be superfluous.
But participatory alternatives to exit may have their own limitations. Dillon's Rule can be justified, therefore, if it addresses the conditions that place limits on exercise of the voice option and if those limits
are sufficiently significant that the mix of exit and voice cannot provide
54. ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). See Rose, supra note 19; Gillette, supra note 3, at

944-45.
55. See Rose, supra note 19, at 96-97. Thus Briffault writes, "The idea of local governments as
governments as centers of collective decision making rather than as firms that supply goods to the
municipal marketplace is certainly the underpinning of the legal authority of local governments."
Briffault, supra note 2, at 416. My own view is that the choice between participation and supply is
less binary than Briffault suggests. The focus of participation at the local level is quite often about
what goods the "municipal firm" should supply to its constituents. That point notwithstanding, his
position that localities provide a forum for the debate is certainly correct.
56. On strict enforcement of the Tiebout criteria, this would encompass every case in which a
resident lost a vote, since Tiebout assumes that there is available a range of communities that fills the
full range of public goods possibilities. Thus, each loser would migrate to a community that provided the preferred basket of public goods.
57. This may overstate the case. If perfect mobility existed, those who favored communitarian
localities would be perfectly free to gravitate to them. If, however, one views communitarianism as
good for everyone, even for those who would not select it, then the sentence in the text stands.
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residents with something approximating their preferred package of goods
and services. If constituents could avoid these defects by constraining
local authority, that would provide the consensual basis for limiting municipal autonomy necessary to rescue Dillon's Rule. It is to the possibility that these conditions are met that I now turn.
IV.

A

CONSENSUAL THEORY FOR DILLON'S RULE

Begin by recalling that the initial argument for local government is
as a supplier of public goods and services. These are goods that would
presumably be undersupplied (from a social perspective) without government because any resident who engages in their production will be unable to exclude others from benefiting, will be unable to collect
contributions from other beneficiaries, or will be unable to coordinate
with others willing to contribute in order to ensure optimal supply. Note
that undersupply of these goods is possible even if failure to participate in
producing them is not a dominant strategy. In short, the possibility of
free riding on the efforts of others does not inexorably lead to a Prisoner's
Dilemma in which no public goods are provided. It does, however, indicate that we may be in the more precarious situation (a Chicken Game)
where public goods are likely to be underprovided because of uncertainty
over the conduct of other parties. An individual may benefit from supplying public goods, but would benefit even more if someone else performed the same task and could not compel contributions from other
beneficiaries. Even in this situation, some people may step forward to
supply the popularly desired public goods, even though they know that
others will free ride on their efforts. One reason may be that the others
have successfully communicated an unwillingness to act, so that unless
the remainder themselves act, the desired good will not be produced.
Thus, a common solution to the Chicken Game dilemma is to precommit
not to cooperate before others can do so. 58 The result is that those others
must cooperate if the public good is to be produced at all. As long as
personal benefits from acting exceed personal costs and these individuals
do not suffer too much envy, the failure of others to cooperate will not
necessarily prevent these individuals from acting. A second solution to
the Chicken Game lies in the possibility that some altruists may exist,
indifferent to personal costs and benefits. A third possibility is the appearance of a discrete subgroup that gets sufficient benefit from providing
58. See Jean Hampton, Free-Rider Problems in the Production of Collective Goods, 3 EcON. &
PHIL. 245, 262 (1987); Michael Taylor & Hugh Ward, Chickens, Whales, and Lumpy Goods: Alternative Models of Public-Goods Provision, 30 POL. STUD. 350 (1982).
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the good to others (as opposed to providing it for personal consumption
as in the case of the first group) that it is worthwhile to them to incur the
related costs, regardless of what others do.
The problem is that, in each of these cases, it is unlikely that the
producers will provide the exact good in the exact form that the public at
large would prefer. The first group may not produce at all. Precommitment by defectors may successfully signal others that they must produce
the good or forgo its production entirely. But effective precommitment
requires communication to all other players, a strategy that becomes
costly once the number of players increases, and is likely to be impossible
where their numbers approach those of even small localities.5 9 Even if
some are willing to produce, they will only produce the quantity and
quality of the good necessary to satisfy personal, rather than social preferences, and personal preferences may require more or less of the good
than is socially desirable. 6° Altruists (the second group), although seeking to satisfy social preferences, may misunderstand the public desire or
be incompetent and thus provide too much or too little, notwithstanding
their best efforts to satisfy the public interest. 6 1 The third group, political
entrepreneurs, may produce quantities and qualities of goods sufficient to
capture the gains of entrepreneurship, but this point may also deviate
62
substantially from the social optimum.
The possibility of these results leads to the received view that, left to
their own devices, rational, self-interested, utility maximizing individuals
would, perversely, undersupply public goods that all desire. 63 The standard solution to the problem lies in the creation of government, an entity
authorized to provide the preferred goods and exact from constituents
the contributions they are willing to make in the first place, as long as
64
they are paying only their fair share and for a good they in fact desire.
59. See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 538-39 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 1978).
Jean Hampton has noted that there may be situations in which more than one, but not all persons
affected by the public good are necessary for its production. In that situation, some selection mechanism is needed to determine which of the affected parties should participate in production. See JEAN
HAMPTON, HOBBES AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT TRADITION

262 (1986).

60. See Christopher Bliss & Barry Nalebuff, Dragon-Slaying and Ballroom Dancing: The Private Supply of a Public Good, 25 J. PUB. ECON. 1 (1984); Clayton P. Gillette, Who Puts the Public in
the Public Good?: A Comment on Cass, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 534, 541-43 (1988).

61. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other
Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1978).
62. See, e.g., RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 35-37 (1982); Bruce A. Ackerman et al.,
Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, I J.L. ECON. &

ORG. 313 (1985).
63. Conceivably, the provider would oversupply, from a social perspective, the amount of public goods. A defense contractor, for instance, has incentives to sell the government more than the
optimal number of weapons necessary to ensure the public good of national defense.
64. Numerous scholars have indicated that government is not necessary to bring about this
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Agreement to local government effectively transforms the non-cooperative Chicken Game into an Assurance Game, in which all parties are
inexorably driven to cooperate because government makes possible enforcement of the implicit agreement. What remains to be demonstrated
is that individuals who seek to avoid undersupply of local public goods
by agreeing to the formation of local government would also agree to
have that government constrained by Dillon's Rule.
Within a locality, some decision must be made about which public
goods among the variety available should be provided. Given that no
local budget is without constraints, some trade-off is inevitable among
eligible activities, such as schools, police protection, road paving, and tax
collection. If the "public" nature of these goods creates the need for
government (what I will call the first-order problem), however, then we
should recognize that decisions by government about which goods to
provide and about their allocation raise the same kind of problem that
government was intended to cure. Government (at least legitimate government) will govern by reacting to the signals of constituents about their
preferences. At least, that is what we expect of government and the
predicate for believing that both exit and voice will generate changes in
government policy. If numerous people share a preference for the same
allocation, however, any can free ride on the efforts of the others to govern, or to secure the agreement of other governors to make the favored
allocation. Given majoritarian rule, the probability of obtaining a favored allocation might be thought to increase with the number of advocates for that allocation. Nevertheless, participating in the advocacy
process is itself costly. Thus, potential supporters may believe that their
personal contributions produce diminishing marginal returns and are unnecessary to effect the desired result. Hence, government itself must be
viewed as a public good. Once we recognize that fact, however, it follows
that government is subject to the same misallocation as other public
65
goods, in what we might call a second-order public goods problem.
The implication of conceiving of government as a public good is that
those who step forward to govern or to secure the benefits of government
result, that cooperation will evolve among repeat players. See, e.g.,

ANTHONY DEJASAY, SOCIAL
CONTRACT, FREE RIDE 12 (1989); MICHAEL TAYLOR, THE POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATION (1987);
Hampton, supra note 58; GREGORY KAVKA, HOBBESIAN MORAL AND POLITICAL THEORY (1986).

I believe that each of these contributions demonstrates that some public goods will be provided
through cooperation in the absence of government; but none demonstrates that the same level of
public goods will be so provided.
65. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk Courts & Agencies, 138 U. PA. L.
REV. 1027, 1064-70 (1990); DEJASAY, supra note 64, at 12 (sanctions necessary to enforce co-ordination problems themselves raise second-order co-ordination problems).
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may do so not because their preferences coincide with those of the public
at large, but because they have a peculiar preference that makes it worthwhile to secure those benefits in a manner that coincides with their own
interest. In short, the same motivations of self-interest that create the
public goods problem in the first place also infect its solution.
The result is that government is unlikely to allocate resources within
its control (first-order public goods) strictly in accordance with the preferences of all, or even a majority of, its constituents. In itself, this result
is neither surprising nor nefarious. Outside the Tiebout world, one
would expect that preferences among constituents of any locality will diverge. Under these circumstances, and assuming limited municipal resources, some model of fair division among competing groups would be
appropriate. What constitutes a fair division under these circumstances
is open to debate. For some, taking intensity of preferences or personal
utility into account would be appropriate; 66 for others ensuring an equal
67
share of municipal resources to each constituent would be appropriate;
for some an equal share of each resource is appropriate; 68 and for some
allocation by lottery may be appropriate. 69 There is not necessarily a
single standard by which to judge the propriety of the rule of fair division. Indeed, one strength of municipal autonomy is its capacity to permit different localities to attract those residents who share a particular
vision of the optimal allocation rule. Further, it may be appropriate
within a single locality to allocate different resources by use of different
standards (e.g., it would make no sense to allocate welfare services on a
willingness-to-pay standard that purports to measure intensity of preference, but it might make sense to allocate access to a municipal golf
course in that manner). Even if a wide variety of acceptable rules of fair
allocation exists, however, it is likely that, with respect to any particular
good, the allocation selected by government will coincide with none of
them. Instead, the second-order public goods problem suggests that, for
numerous goods, government will select a rule of allocation that most
(those who received a suboptimal supply) would agree is outside the permissible range, i.e., by supplying any good to those with the greatest capacity to make their preferences heard where that metric does not
necessarily coincide with public interest.
66. RICHARD BRAITHWAITE, THEORY OF GAMES AS A TOOL FOR THE MORAL PHILOSOPHER
(1955); John Nash, The Bargaining Problem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 155 (1950).
67.

BRIAN BARRY, THEORIES OF JUSTICE 85-95 (1989); Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality-

Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283 (1981).
68. DANIEL W. FESSLER & CHARLES M. HAAR, THE WRONG SIDE OF THE TRACKS (1986).
69. See Lewis Kornhauser & Lawrence Sager, Just Lotteries, 27 Soc. SCi. INFO. 483 (1988).
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The likelihood of this result may become evident by examining a
single local government decision. Assume that a city council is deciding
whether to allow development of a conservation area within the municipality. Developers obviously anticipate substantial financial benefits
from an affirmative vote, while preservationists would prefer a negative
vote. Because the number of developers will likely be small, one might
imagine that their preferences will be ignored if a large number of
preservationists exists. This same numerical disparity, however, means
that any single developer will likely be unable to secure benefits without
direct participation in the political process of lobbying the city council.
In addition, the benefits of participation by developers are likely to be
substantial (high profits), so that expected gains of involvement will
likely outweigh even the certain costs of participation. Preservationists,
however, face a very different payoff schedule from participation. Since
they are numerically superior, the need for any one of them to become
involved declines, as similar (if not identical) benefits can be obtained if
other preservationists lobby. 70 Additionally, the benefit of involvement
may also be small, depending on matters such as how much other conservation land exists in the vicinity or how far the preservationist lives from
the threatened area. 71 The result is that any given developer is likely to
participate in the lobbying effort while any given preservationist is not,
thus sending a skewed signal to the city council.
Note that there is nothing insidious in the conduct described above.
Although it leads to a decision favored by a minority of current residents, 72 the result occurs through the very political process that advocates of localism seek to foster. The only problem is that numerous
residents have decided not to participate (a result that may diminish if
participation were more of a social norm), because the personal costs of
participation outweigh personal benefits. But the same result could be
obtained through a more perverse process. Assume, for instance, a classic example of public goods, police protection. Assume that A and B live
in a neighborhood affected by crime. A may suggest that patrolling the
70. The result may not be identical because greater numbers will translate into a greater showing of support for the preservationist position, which is likely to help persuade the city council.
Nevertheless, the marginal benefit generated by the involvement of any one preservationist is likely
to be small.
71. A variety of reasons exist why preservationists may band together to form a lobbying
group. See Robert C. Mitchell, National Environmental Lobbies and the Apparent Illogic of Collective Action, in CLIFFORD S. RUSSELL, COLLECTIVE DECISION MAKING 87-121 (1979). Thus, the

argument in the text should be read as a statement of relative tendencies, rather than absolute
prediction.
72. It may be favored by a larger number of non-residents, i.e., those who would immigrate to
the locality in order to live in the new development.
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neighborhood is likely to reduce the incidence of crime. B may openly
disagree in the hope that if A is sufficiently convinced of B's unwillingness to contribute, A will bear the entire costs of patrolling, notwithstanding that cooperation will reduce a substantially greater amount of
crime. If A takes the bait, A will be unable to exclude B from the benefits, notwithstanding B's non-contribution. If we assume a similar level
of self-interestedness throughout the relevant community, however, then
A is likely to be engaged in the same concealment of preferences as B.
Neither will provide what each desires.
Both A and B would prefer that the other supply the public good of
patrol, but if the other fails to do so, each would prefer to act rather than
have neither act. Thus, assume that patrolling the neighborhood costs a
total of 100. This cost could be incurred by A or B alone, or evenly
divided (50 each) between them. (Obviously, other apportionments are
possible, but for the sake of simplicity we will limit ourselves to equal
division.) Patrolling, whether done by A or B or by A and B, creates a
gain of 125 to each (a social total of 250) from avoided theft losses.
Thus, it is worthwhile for each to incur the full cost of patrolling, but
each comes out better if the other incurs the entire cost. The worst case
obtains if neither patrols; in that situation each actor can anticipate no
gain over the status quo, where each suffers losses through theft in excess
of avoidance costs. These choices can be summarized in the following
matrix, each box of which represents the payoffs (the sum of benefits
(avoided theft losses) less payments) to each player who is preparing to
73
choose whether to patrol or hold out.

B

A

Patrol
Hold
Out

Patrol

Hold Out

75,75

25,125

125,25
I_

0,0
I

It is quite unclear what the parties will do in such a case. Each has
an incentive to hold out. But if neither patrols, they will bring about
catastrophic results that could have been avoided had they been willing
to coordinate at the outset or had the cooperative solution imposed on
them. In the absence of coordination, it is possible that neither will pro73. In accordance with game theory convention, the payoff for the party represented by rows
(here, A) is shown first in each box, and the party represented by columns (here, B) is shown second.
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vide the service that each wants. Again, the traditional solution to this
Chicken Game is to create a government that can provide police protection to both A and B and extract from each of them the relevant cost.
Once we posit the introduction of government, however, our second-order public goods problem arises. A and B are each better off by up
to 50 if they can shift all the costs of patrol onto the other. Thus, each
has an incentive to make a side payment to government of up to 50 in
return for shifting policing costs onto the other. 74 Given the monopoly
status of local government as an enforcer of these deals, one would anticipate that each government would attempt to extract these payments from
the competing parties, increasing the deviation from the socially optimal
solution. If we are truly in a universe consisting of only two residents,
the likelihood that either will have success is somewhat reduced, as each
is willing to make the bid and each is capable of monitoring the conduct
of the other. But outside this universe, we may face a problem identical
to the development problem above, i.e., one group may have a distinct
advantage over any competing group in its capacity to form a coalition
and thereby better be able to convince government to impose on those
others a greater than pro rata share of the costs.
Note that the nature of the political process here is quite different
from the ideal participatory model that makes the voice option a meaningful alternative to exit as a means for obtaining a package of public
goods compatible with local preferences. These situations do not entail
robust debate by matched sides that have competing preferences.
Rather, the consequence is one-sided domination of a debate in which
adversely affected interests are not represented. Indeed, given the relative capacity of small groups to coalesce and to monitor members' behavior, it is likely that privileged minorities will pose a greater threat to
social welfare than the more traditionally suspect raw majorities.
Now how does all this relate to Dillon's Rule? To begin, notice that
local issues have characteristics that tend to exacerbate both formation of
privileged groups and free riding by latent groups. The possibility that
interest groups are particularly likely to form at the local level stems
from that body of collective action theory that suggests the possibility of
collective action is directly related to size of the affected group. 75 This
possibility arises from a variety of incentives that are not easily replicated
among large groups. First, within a small group, reputation may be important, so that disfavoring of free riding can be directed at particular
74.

DEJASAY,

supra note 64, at 67-68.

75. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 36 (1971).
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individuals. Second, and related, among small groups there remains the
possibility of monitoring the performance of actors and imposing sanctions, reputational or otherwise. Each of these elements is more likely to
materialize at the local level, where small-group members are likely to
have personal relationships, which makes reputation important, and to
be repeat players, which facilitates monitoring and organization.
At the same time, those who do not join interest groups at the local
level are likely to have increased tendencies to free ride on the efforts of
others. Recall that the structure of the Chicken Game is such that each
player finds it worthwhile to cooperate in production of the collective
good, but each player also does better by defecting as long as someone
else produces the good. Thus, whether one is willing to act depends on
the probability with which one believes someone else will act. The result
is somewhat paradoxical. If I believe that someone else shares my preferences for the collective good, I might expect that other is more likely to
prefer that it be produced. Thus I have less incentive to act in the expectation that the other person will. The probability that there exists an
alternative actor with preferences similar to mine increases at the local
level because residents already have some affinity of preferences, as evidenced by the fact that they all live in the same locality. That is to say,
even if-outside the Tiebout world-a perfect alignment of interests is
not achieved among all residents, it may nevertheless be the case that a
tendency exists for like-minded people to gravitate to the same general
area. Indeed, even those who live in a municipality out of lack of mobility might take on the ethos of that area. At the same time, if all likeminded people do a similar calculus, then the preferences of all are less
likely to be satisfied.
This increased asymmetry of enhanced political activity by those in
privileged groups and of free riding by others, however, will not exist
only with respect to a single good. General purpose municipalities must
supply a basket of public goods and services. To the extent that residents
of a locality outside the Tiebout world have disparate (if similar) preferences, different groups are likely to favor different contents for the basket
or different priorities among the contents. Developers will want more
development than the community as a whole, parents will want more
educational facilities, the elderly will want more parks and police protection, the poor will want more social services. The result is that each of
these groups has incentives to form an effective interest group with respect to its favored good. Each group similarly has incentives to make
contributions necessary to achieve the interests of the group, at least up
to an amount that the expected benefit from passage of preferred legisla-
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tion exceeds the amount of the contribution. Further, local governors
have incentives to seek these contributions from readily identifiable interests. If each group seeks to accomplish its own ends at the expense of
others, substantial deadweight losses will occur as resources of each
group are spent lobbying government. 7 6 As each group incurs and imposes these losses in attempts to gain more than its "fair" share of the
local budget, the tragic result is less for all than any fair division of social
resources within the acceptable range would provide. Further losses will
be incurred by groups that invest unsuccessfully in winning the favor of
government.77

The result is that, even if all citizens belong to interest groups that
occasionally obtain gains on issues salient to them and at the expense of
others, those occasional gains are likely to be outweighed by the combination of rent payments and exactions that all other groups impose when
they are successful. The city council, in effect, becomes a commons on
which the battles over allocation of municipal resources generate tragic
results. If all groups involved in this game ultimately lose, then one
would imagine that each group would rationally be willing to forgo engaging in the game at all, as long as all other groups were similarly
bound. Initially, one might believe that the best way to attain this result
would be through mutual agreement against rent-payments. Any such
agreement, however, is impossible to achieve (the relevant groups being
continuously changing in number and membership) or to enforce (each
group having an incentive to break the deal, which itself takes the form
of a Prisoner's Dilemma). Indeed, it is not clear that such an agreement
would be desirable even if achievable and enforceable. The reason is that
the agreement would essentially bar participation in local affairs, which is
desirable as long as all sides of an issue have meaningful access to the
decision maker. The best way to achieve what all would prefer, therefore, is to disempower rent-seeking decision makers under circumstances
that are most susceptible to one-sided factional pressure, either because
the issue holds interest for a limited number of constituents or because
only one side of the issue has a sufficiently intense interest to overcome
obstacles to collective action. In either event, the result is what I will call
one-sided lobbying. This does not mean that government bodies are not
entitled to make allocational decisions. Rather it means that the govern76. See Anne Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 No.3 AM. ECON.
REV. 291 (1974); Fred McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of
Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1987); Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and
Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807 (1975).
77. See Posner, supra note 76, at 812.
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ment body selected to make the decision should be one likely to make it
in an environment that minimizes one-sided lobbying. That this result
would be favored by all seems implicit in acceptance of the role of local
government as a response to the first-order public goods problem. Certainly it would be odd to address that problem by creating an institution
that is itself subject to the same distortions. Thus, if one believed that
one-sided lobbying was more likely to materialize at the local than at the
state level, and if one could identify those discrete sets of cases in which
such lobbying was likely to occur, it would be appropriate to restrict the
capacity of localities to make decisions in those cases.
This, I suggest, is the moving force behind (or at least an ex post
justification of) Dillon's Rule. Where interaction among players leads to
decreasing social returns, and devastating returns for those who do not
win, the superior strategy for all is often not to play the game. 78 In the
absence of an ability to bind each other contractually, the Rule serves as
a mechanism by which all players precommit not to pay rents to local
officials where the result is likely to be a limited set of benefits at general
public expense. 79 The function of judges asked to determine whether a
local act falls within the scope of local authority, according to this interpretation of the Rule, is to neutralize the downward spiral of strategic
behavior by prohibiting local initiative in those situations where any local
subgroup has an organizational advantage for registering its members'
preferences and thus misstating popular preferences to decision makers
or colluding with public officials.
Identification of those cases on an ad hoc basis would be a difficult
proposition, and would itself be subject to the kinds of free riding issues
that the identification is attempting to solve. Who would come forward
to challenge a particular group as dominant? Doesn't the mere assertion
of one group's dominance indicate the presence of a resistance group?
Hence, some generic description of cases likely to fall within the category
may be appropriate, even if imperfect. Dillon's Rule provides an opportunity for this process insofar as municipal entrance into a novel activity,
not expressly within the realm of activities considered by the legislature,
78. Norms of retribution may have this characteristic. If each injury requires a vengeful response of a higher degree of injury, then escalation ultimately is destructive to all parties. In this
way social norms that encourage vengeance may be contrary both to self-interest and to efficient
social production. See JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY 118-21 (1989). Similarly, see ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991); DOUGLAS HOFSTADTER, METAMAGICAL
THEMAS 733-34 (1985).
79. See RUSSELL HARDIN, MORALITY WITHIN THE LIMITS OF REASON 92-93 (1988) ("In all
these cases, the members of a relevant class are potentially pitted against each other to their collective harm, and the only way to secure them against that collective harm is to deny them singly the
right to free-ride on the abstinence of other members of the class.").
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may signal that a discrete group has prevailed on city officials to grant an
idiosyncratic benefit. This is not to say that novel activities are undesirable or to refute the laboratory model of local government. It is only to
suggest that involvement in such activities may warrant examination to
ensure that they are indeed experiments intended to further the locality's
interest rather than to provide a windfall to a particular group.
To the extent that this argument is contingent on the avoidance of
deadweight losses, one point should be clear. The concept of deadweight
losses in this situation is somewhat more complex than in the typical case
of rent-seeking. That is true, at least, if one assumes that participation
may be of positive value, for instance, as a consumption good. If deadweight losses include all costs incurred to influence lawmakers, then
there is no reason to believe that they will be less where there exist numerous well-matched groups to compete for slices of the local budget pie
rather than a single dominant interest group. Indeed, the presence of
myriad interest groups, as the pluralist model of democracy envisions,
may increase the total resources invested in political activity, even
80
though the probability of success for any particular group diminishes.
It is unclear, however, that the costs incurred in the multiple interest
group scenario should be considered deadweight losses. Local issues generate interest among residents (grass roots movements) rather than only
"professional" lobbyists, i.e., those who are repeat players before the city
council such as zoning lawyers and developers."' This may have a variety of positive effects. If participation is considered a consumption good
to the individuals who become involved, then their participation may be
value-enhancing.82 If their participation improves the quality of decision
making, i.e., makes decision makers more attentive to arguments that
otherwise would not have been considered, then again it is difficult to
80. For this reason, local officials might be encouraged to subsidize the creation of competing
interest groups in order to maximize collectible rents. That effort, however, presumably will not be
undertaken where the obstacles to organization are too great or where privileged groups can make
sufficient payments to the local officials not to create subsidies.
81. See, e.g., JAMES E. KRIER & EDMUND URSIN, POLLUTION AND POLICY (1977).
82. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, SHIFTING INVOLVEMENTS (1982); Gillette, supra note 3, at
951-52. Fred McChesney has recently suggested that consumers suffer a disadvantage relative to
producers for purposes of organizing because the latter obtain both private and political benefits
from organization, while the former obtain only political. His definition of political seems, quite
narrowly, to include only the ability to pay regulatory rents. The private benefits available to producers include exchange of information, joint advertising, and development of industry standards. But
if participation constitutes a consumption good for consumers (or consumer-voters), then there is no
reason to deny their capacity to enjoy private benefits that augment the rental payments that
McChesney designates as public. See Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Interest-Group Organization in a Coasean Model of Regulation, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 73, 77-79 (1991).
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consider the process to be one that produces deadweight losses.8 3
Nevertheless, these results are unlikely to exist where lobbying is
heavily one-sided. One would expect from the discussion about the formation of groups capable of overcoming collective action obstacles that
grass roots movements are not typically the first lobbying group to appear; rather they tend to materialize in response to the successes of previously organized groups. 8 4 Thus, it is possible to constrain government
activity where one-sided lobbying exists without necessarily diminishing
the value of political participation. Where there is a single dominant interest group, that group is unlikely to comprise unseasoned, non-professional civic participants. Instead, that group is likely to comprise
professional lobbyists most readily identified with "deadweight" losses
85
that accompany rent-seeking.
This rationale for Dillon's Rule as a means by which residents
would mutually agree to deprive localities of rent-seeking activities provides an analytical basis for the intuitive negative reaction to Early Estates. One can criticize that decision by speaking of the imperial or
unreasoned nature of the majority in the face of the judgment of elected
city councillors. But I think that the best defense of the ordinance, and
hence the best attack on the decision, lies in the implicit assumptions
about the nature of the city council's decision making process. Begin by
asking who is helped and who hurt by the challenged provisions. One
would imagine that landlords would be opposed to such an ordinance, in
part because of uncertainty about the extent to which they could pass
costs of improvements on to their tenants. 86 In the absence of perfect
markets, landlords would likely be required to incur some of the ultimate
costs of improvements. That they feared this result is implicit in the very
existence of the suit challenging the ordinance. The type of improvements required suggest that the tenants affected by the new requirements
were likely to be of relatively low income, and thus to have limited discretionary funds to spend on improvements in housing.
The effect of the ordinance on the class of tenants is somewhat ambiguous.8 7 Current tenants would presumably be assisted by the require83. It is noteworthy, however, that this model does not prevent rent seeking where political
competition is available. Control of that phenomenon must await other legal doctrines.
84. See, e.g., KRIER & URSIN, supra note 81.
85. See MUELLER, supra note 41, at 213 n.1; Roger D. Congleton, Evaluating Rent-Seeking
Losses: Do the Welfare Gains of Lobbyists Count?, 56 PUB. CHOICE 181 (1988).
86. See Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules. Efficiency and Distribution in
Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361 (1991).
87. One may argue that tenants could have simply bargained for the improvements if they were
truly desirable. The public good nature of hallway lighting and hot water pipes, however, diminish
the likelihood that the bargain solution would occur. In a multi-family apartment house, however,
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ments, but might believe that subsequent rent increases would render
their apartments unaffordable. The consequences of the requirements for
the last affected group, potential tenants, are similarly ambiguous. If
rents increase in response to improvements, some may be unable to afford the improved units. Those who can afford to move in, however,
may be better off insofar as they are willing to pay their pro rata share of
the improvements, but would have been unable to bargain with landlords
for the improvements had they not been required by ordinance.8 8 On the
interpretation of Dillon's Rule that I have offered, judicial interpretation
of the human habitation standard to reject the ordinance would be warranted if, but only if, one or more of these groups had been excluded
from the city's decision making process and the city's decision was inimical to the interests of the excluded group. This combination would serve
as substantial evidence that the decision neither was motivated by a conception of public interest nor reflected a fair division of municipal
resources. 89
The problem with Early Estates is that no such bias in the decision
making process is apparent. Two of the affected groups, present and potential tenants, are not necessarily of a single mind about the issue. In
addition, to the extent that they would prefer the ordinance, neither of
these groups was likely, in the early 1960's, to have substantial voice
within the city council. This is not necessarily the result of any invidious
discrimination against the poor or any ethnic group within the poor.
Rather, it results again from recognition that effectively attaining the city
council's ear is not a costless proposition. Certainly future tenants would
face serious obstacles to overcoming the problems of lobbying costs and
free riding on the efforts of other future tenants. They are unlikely to be
able to identify each other, and maybe not themselves, as either positively
or negatively affected by the ordinance. In the case of future residents,
they may not yet have any particular basis for seeking the attention of the
council.
Current tenants will similarly face substantial obstacles to collective
action, even if they are of a single mind about the consequences of the
the repeated interactions of residents might be considered sufficient to overcome the collective action
problem. Nevertheless, the failure of tenants to achieve this solution could be attributable to numerous factors. See text following note 89 infra.
88. As I discuss below, within the multifamily apartment these improvements would have constituted public goods susceptible to all the strategies that go with that status. Thus, it would have
been unlikely that any one tenant would have bargained with the landlord for, say, installation of hot
water pipes only to that tenant's apartment in return for higher rent.
89. Collective action, that is, may evolve, but the evolutionary period may be substantial.
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ordinance. 90 First, tenants may have been relatively transient, thus rendering organization difficult. Second, fear of retributive eviction or nonrenewal of leases could deter anti-landlord movements. (Recall that the
law barring retributive eviction had not developed.) Third, an ethos of
collective action, e.g., tenants' unions, was unlikely as evident in 1960 as
it is today.
If there is an interested group that seems particularly capable of
overcoming the collective action obstacle and influencing the council, it
appears to be the landlords. While likely small in number, and possibly
including non-residents, the financial interests of the landlords, or a critical mass of them, 9 1 in avoiding mandated expenditures may be sufficiently great to justify their undertaking the costs associated with
lobbying city officials to oppose the ordinance and appearing at hearings
on the issue. Their relatively small number may have reduced opportunities of any one of them for free riding on the efforts of others, while
facilitating efforts to monitor and organize the participation and allocate
costs among those willing to cooperate. Similarly, as potential repeat
players before city officials (imagine the occasional need for zoning variances, new construction permits, etc.) and as individuals more likely than
tenants to have financial resources that could be helpful to those officials,
they were more likely to have access to avenues that influence decision
making. True, their smaller numbers make them less likely to deliver
votes directly; but if low-income tenants were unlikely to vote in large
numbers and the financial contributions of landlords enabled city officials
to run campaigns that persuaded others to vote for them, that would
seem substantially to compensate for the small number of votes landlords
actually cast.
On this analysis, one would anticipate that landlords would be well
positioned to control the legislative outcome in a manner that might raise
suspicions about a city council ordinance favoring the landlords' position. Thus, if the city council had passed legislation that limited the obligations of landlords to make housing habitable, judicial intervention in
the form of narrowly construing local authority to pass such legislation
90. Again they will not be, since some current tenants will fear that subsequent increases in rent
will make their current homes unaffordable.
91. In his useful comments on this paper, Professor Gary Schwartz notes that the number of
landlords in a city may be sizeable. Gary T. Schwartz, Reviewing and Revising Dillon's Rule, 67
CH.-KENT L. REV. 1025, 1031 (1991). While that is true, the number of landlords who own several
properties or who rent numerous dwellings is likely to be smaller. Some landlords are only renting a
room in their own primary residence. If "commercial" landlords are small in number, and able to
coalesce, they may find it worthwhile to represent all landlords, even though "occasional" landlords
can free ride on the efforts of this subgroup.
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might be considered as a positive check on the relative abilities of competing interests to attain the legislative ear. But just the opposite occurred in Early Estates. What makes that case unpalatable is narrow
judicial construction where the city council acted in a manner contrary to
the perceived dominant interest. Where, as here, local legislation appears
inconsistent with a privileged group's preferences, it is more difficult to
justify judicial intervention as a remedy for interest group capture.
One could imagine that some other privileged group would have favored the ordinance. Electricians and plumbers, for instance, might obtain additional employment by enactment of lighting and hot water
requirements. If they are already formed into unions, and thus had overcome obstacles to organization, they would serve as an effective counterweight to the interests of landlords. But the presence of these groups
does not alter the ultimate analysis. At the most, it demonstrates that
the city council had been open to interest group bargaining conducive to
productive debate and consideration of the public interest. Hence, there
would seem to be diminished need for judicial intervention.
Early Estates deserves criticism, therefore, because it reflects judicial
92
intervention in the absence of any breakdown of the political process.
The negative implication, however, is that judicial limitations on local
authority would be appropriate where we can identify local legislation
that serves particular interests at the expense of those un- or underrepresented in the political process. This principle does not constitute a
hunting license for the judiciary; nor should it, given the possibility that
judges, too, are susceptible to capture (from prestigious law firms, for
instance). But where local legislation reflects the idiosyncratic interests
of certain residents and of the city officials who vote on programs that
may serve those interests, the judiciary is more justified in playing the
role that Farber and Frickey describe as "mandating legislative delibera-

92. Avi Soifer has suggested to me a danger of too strict an application of this position. The
point has to do with the argument that falls under the general heading of "baselines." Assume that a
previously dominant interest group has fallen into disarray, e.g., landlords once able to coalesce have
become sufficiently dispersed in an age of real estate investment trusts and absentee ownership that
they currently lack local political clout. In the interim, tenants' rights groups have gained power, so
they now attain the status of a dominant interest group. If the tenants now push through the city
council a novel pro-tenant ordinance not expressly authorized by state legislation, a court employing
the above scheme will be justified in invoking Dillon's Rule to require legislative approval. The
result, however, will be to leave in place a scheme enacted through an equally skewed process, but
that has become entrenched. I cannot deny such a possibility but am not sure that, even where
demonstrable, it informs a court how to deal with the case currently before it. At the very least, the
possibility of such a "baseline" problem should constitute an argument before the legislature by the
group that currently seeks to have its interest satisfied.
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tion, '' 93 but that I understand to mean policing the political process.
Any ad hoc investigation by the judiciary is likely to create the very displacement of legislative consideration by judicial prejudices that cause
Farber and Frickey to eschew more substantive judicial review. 94 A general principle of strict construction of local government power, however,
may be perfectly sensible where courts have reason to believe that something has gone awry with the model of local government as a place for
robust debate among competing interest groups. 95 The most likely situation in which debate will reveal one-sided lobbying arises when a locality
is asked to invest in a relatively novel enterprise. At that time, interests
partial to the proposal will have had an opportunity to organize and plan
a strategy. Competing interests, however, may have had insufficient opportunities to coalesce, even if they are otherwise able to do so. Thus, a
doctrine such as Dillon's Rule, which is directed at relatively novel local
activities, appears appropriate to curtail the most likely instances of onesided lobbying.
Early Estates, therefore, does not represent any malevolent strain
inherent in Dillon's Rule other than its potential misuse in the hands of
bad judging. In this respect, it is difficult to distinguish Dillon's Rule
from any other maxim of statutory construction. What this interpretation of the Rule does suggest is that the basis on which we want to critique its use is one that may very well be consistent with Judge Dillon's
underlying strategy: reducing municipal power where it is likely to be
used counter to majoritarian interests. Notice, however, that this requires no adherence to a fictitious public/private distinction and no in96
trinsic attachment to the priority of private property.
93. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudenceof Public Choice, 65 TEX. L.
REV. 873, 914 (1987).
94. Id. at 908-11.
95. None of this is to say that the city council in Providence was necessarily motivated by
public interest. The city council may have been captured by some ideological interest, no less powerful than an economically interested one, e.g., a nascent tenants' rights movement. Nevertheless ideological groups would seem less susceptible to differential collective action obstacles than economic
groups. Thus, different ideological groups would seem to have access to the city council relatively
equal to their numbers and relatively equal in power to vote in sympathetic officials proportional to
group strength.
96. My explanation of Dillon's Rule as an effort to prevent one-sided lobbying of city officials is
intended more as an ex post justification than as a description of the motives of Judge Dillon. Nevertheless, I believe that this view is entirely consistent with his stated reasons for the Rule. The source
of Dillon's concerns was not the exercise of governmental power generally, but the capacity of one
set of constituents to impose burdens on another, unrepresented class. This reading is implicit in
Dillon's rigid separation of municipal debt for public and private purposes. He fought a losing battle
against the use of municipal debt to finance private railroads, the failure of which led to debt repudiation or fiscal distress throughout the midwest during the period that he was formulating his theories. Even after railroad aid bonds were validated in most jurisdictions, Dillon took some solace
from the fact that courts upholding them had done so on the theory that they satisfied a public

DILLON'S RULE
V.

OBJECTIONS

A. Alternatives to Dillon's Rule to constrain one-sided lobbying
One may still suggest that Dillon's Rule is unnecessary to constrain
one-sided lobbying and continues to do mischief where applied outside
the area of collective action failures. After all, Early Estates itself remains a testament to the judicial capacity for unjustified intervention.
On this view, alternative means of avoiding capture of the local decision
maker might be superior. In rejecting the Dillon's Rule tradition, the
Utah Supreme Court pointed to three mechanisms for avoiding local
abuse of the initiative power, by which we might understand the court to
mean catering to special interests. 97 The court indicated that appropriate
checks on local excesses may be found in electoral review of officials,
legislative supervision, and judicial oversight.
The problem is that each of the alternatives suggested by the court
depends on a viable political market that the collective action problem
renders improbable. Elections are unlikely to serve as a useful monitoring mechanism because voters are faced with a binary choice in which
they can only register occasional approval or disapproval of an official's
overall performance. No one act of favoritism or misfeasance is likely to
be pivotal for a majority of voters, and many voters may be persuaded to
re-elect an official who has delivered on a matter of salient importance to
purpose; thus, these courts did not violate the theoretical distinction that barred municipal aid for
"certain individuals or classes, or in aid of the manufacturing enterprise of individuals or private
corporations," a use of the public treasury that would serve a purely private purpose. Dillon, supra
note 15, at 444. While this distinction can be accounted for by a claim that Dillon wanted to minimize the reach of government generally, it is equally consistent (especially given the stated antipathy
for legislation in assistance of "certain individuals or classes") with the concern that interested
groups with disproportionately high access to municipal decision makers (railroad promoters) could
accrue substantial rents by obtaining public resources that would return private gain. Indeed, it is
just that concern that arguably led Dillon to prefer a narrow scope for government activity. What I
think resolves the issue in favor of that reading is Dillon's explicit attention to the fact that, in the
case of municipal bonds, what separated the represented from the unrepresented was not a geographical boundary, but a temporal one. The issuance of bonds allowed current residents to capture the
benefits of a project, while deferring a substantial part of the cost to future residents who may or may
not find the project worthwhile:
One of these is the stimulus which the long credit commonly provide for effectually supplies, to over-indebtedness. The bonds usually fix a time, twenty or thirty years distant, for
payment of the principal. Those who vote the debt, and the councils or bodies which
create it and issue the bonds, do so without much hesitation, as the burden is expected to
fall principally on posterity. A learned justice of the Supreme Court of the United States
has very fitly described the effect witnessed as a mania for running in debt for public
improvements.
Id. at 441. Dillon's concerns, in short, have less to do with the exercise of power generally than with
the possibility that, given their relative geographical limits and susceptibility to the enticements of
railroad entrepreneurs, local decision makers would be more likely to take action that imposed costs
on the unrepresented.
97. Utah v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1980).
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them, even if the same official has granted favors to other groups. As
long as the latter favors, although costly in the aggregate, individually
impose only small costs and confer benefits that are not salient to those
not benefited, there is likely to be little complaint from the general electorate. Again, the result is downward spiraling net social resources.
Legislative intervention to override the local decision is unlikely to
work for the very same reason that it became necessary. Just as the dominated interests were unable to coalesce at the local level to avoid passage
of the challenged program, so will they be unable to organize and monitor members to tackle the more difficult process of convincing state legislators to intervene. (As we shall see, if the presumption is reversed, as in
Dillon's Rule, so that proponents of local initiative must secure legislative approval, the costs of organization for proponents and opponents
may become more equal.)
Similarly, judicial supervision is unlikely to permit appropriate
levels of monitoring. Judicial process is not self-executing; judicial intervention occurs only when a local act is challenged. But, given the difficulty of organizing a group to oppose the interests that passed the local
legislation, there is little reason to believe that, once it is passed, a particular litigant would invest the time, effort, and money necessary to initiate
and prosecute litigation.9" Thus, the very problem that makes the judicial solution necessary also renders it insufficient. Two counterarguments must be mentioned, as they indicate the possibility of judicial
supervision. The first is that litigation does occasionally materialize.
Cases like Hutchinson in Utah and Early Estates demonstrate the periodic willingness of litigants to come forward. It is true that, as in all
collective action problems, a subgroup with a sufficiently intense interest
may overcome the tendency for inertia. In the Utah case, the issue was
whether a candidate for public office had committed a criminal offense by
violating a local campaign expenditure ordinance. Obviously, the personal benefit of initiating the lawsuit to avoid criminal conviction was
sufficiently high to justify the costs of opposing the ordinance, notwithstanding the public goods effects of the litigation. But this occasional
willingness may be too pathological to use as a benchmark for the appropriate legal rule. One cannot expect a similarly willing creator of public
goods to arise in more mundane situations. Further, even when the interests of the litigant are sufficient to justify production of the public
good (the lawsuit challenging local excess), there is no assurance that the
98. On the difficulties of initiating litigation where prospective plaintiffs are numerous, see Gillette & Krier, supra note 65, at 1048-49.
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litigant will represent the interests of the populace. Indeed, it is likely
that the reason a particular litigant does take measures is that his interest
is sufficiently idiosyncratic to make litigation worthwhile, even though
that is not the case for other members of the group, and those interests
are likely to dominate any litigation or settlement that ensues.
As a second counterargument, one may claim that the same difficulty with judicial supervision of the legislative process arises under Dillon's Rule itself: once the ordinance is passed, someone must still appear
to challenge it in court. The assertion, of course, is true. But the presumption created by Dillon's Rule both lowers the costs and raises the
expected benefits of litigation and thus increases the likelihood that affected groups will find the challenge worthwhile.
B.

The costs of Dillon's Rule

All that I have done to this point has been to identify some benefits
that Dillon's Rule might generate. That leaves open, however, the possibility that the Rule generates costs sufficient to offset those benefits.
Most obvious are the increased transaction costs that the Rule engenders
for municipalities insofar as it requires them to invest resources in seeking explicit legislative authority to engage in a particular activity.99 The
costs associated with lobbying the legislature, engaging in logrolling in
order to secure sufficient support for the measure, and forgoing alternative uses of the resources necessary to accomplish these tasks will typically be significant and may occasionally be sufficient to frustrate
otherwise appropriate attempts to seek legislative authority. Any attempt by the locality to avoid these costs by simply initiating the proposed program without prior legislative approval threatens the possibility
of increased attorney's fees should the program be challenged plus the
loss of any costs sunk in the enterprise should the lawsuit be lost. °°
While it is in the nature of transaction costs to deter otherwise efficient agreements, the problem may be particularly problematic in a case
such as Dillon's Rule, where the need to appeal to the state legislature
engenders another collective action problem-the public goods nature of
99. Similarly, Jonathan Macey has suggested a transaction costs argument to explain why certain interest groups might prefer federal to state regulation. See Jonathan R. Macey, FederalDeference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice

Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265, 271 (1990).
100. Of course, a lawsuit could be initiated against a proposed program even if Dillon's Rule
were reversed. Suits against initiatives proposed by home rule municipalities are not rare. See, e.g.,
City and County of Denver v. Colorado, 788 P.2d 764 (Colo. 1990). But the presumption of invalidity created by Dillon's Rule increases the likelihood that a challenge will be successful and thus
increases the probability that the challenge will be brought.
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state legislation. Localities that incur the costs necessary to secure legislative approval obtain the subsequent benefits not only for themselves,
but for all localities similarly situated.' 0 The consequence is that localities that contribute nothing to the legislative effort can nevertheless obtain the benefits of approval, as long as another locality or group of
localities is willing to incur the necessary costs. Each locality, therefore,
is driven to await action by others, with the effect that socially useful
programs are not implemented.
If the transaction costs or free riding problem (or both together)
were sufficiently significant, the case for Dillon's Rule would be weaker.
Thus, the affirmative case for the Rule depends on a showing that these
costs are not too great. I believe that showing can be made, at least in
two sets of cases. In the first, localities positively affected by a proposal
are sufficiently small in number and sufficiently capable of monitoring
each other to overcome the free riding problem and engage in cost-sharing. This is likely to happen where the localities are geographically close
and seek to address a problem on a regional scale. Their attempt to induce the legislature to permit joint action suggests that cooperation (including sharing costs of obtaining the legislation) is advantageous.' 0 2
The second set of cases involves situations where a local decision
maker is willing to impose transaction costs on the locality in order to
obtain personal benefits, notwithstanding that the locality might obtain
greater net benefits if some other locality acted first. In short, the local
official may believe there exist sufficient entrepreneurial benefits in being
in the forefront of a movement to overcome the incentive to save the
local budget by free riding on the efforts of others. Assume, for instance,
a local official in one of several urban areas in a state is considering
whether to lobby the legislature for a program that would permit tax
increment financing to redevelop a business district. This popular financing mechanism typically involves issuance of bonds secured by increased
property taxes that are assessed against properties improved with bond
proceeds.' 0 3 If several urban areas within the state could benefit from the
new power to issue bonds for this purpose, and the costs of lobbying for
101. Theoretically, a locality could request legislative authority to engage in a particular only for
itself. But most state constitutions contain prohibitions on the passage of "special legislation" that
refers only to a single municipality or to less than all of a reasonable classification of municipalities.
See John M. Winters, Classification of Municipalities, 57 Nw. U. L. REV. 279 (1962).
102. Numerous states have passed legislation permitting localities to act jointly in a manner that
would otherwise be prohibited to them under Dillon's Rule. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 453.53
(permitting cities to form a municipal power agency to meet the energy needs of its members).
103. See John E. Anderson, Tax Increment Financing: Municipal Adoption and Growth, 43
NAT'L TAX J. 155 (1990); Tax Increment Fin. Comm'n of Kansas City v. J.E. Dunn Constr., 781
S.W.2d 70 (Mo. 1989).
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and implementing the program are immediately visited on the municipal
treasury, the traditional free riding problem arises. This same program,
however, may promise to return substantial benefits to local officials in
the short term (i.e., before the next election) in the form of redevelopment of distressed areas. Those benefits, of course, are not translatable
from one locality to another. At the same time, costs of implementing a
financing program are deferred to the long term through the bonding
mechanism. 1 4 The result is that a local official can overcome the free
riding problem where the personal payoff of the enabling legislation is
sufficiently high; counterintuitively, the fear is that the private benefits
available to local officials will mean that appeals to the legislature are
likely to be over-, not underutilized. 0 5 What one would like to know is if
these efforts are likely to correspond more closely to situations in which
local officials are acting in a manner consistent with residents' preferences or more closely to situations in which local officials are acting at
the behest of particular groups.
Finally, increased transaction costs (or the activities that generate
them) are not without their own benefits. If we look at representative
government as a classic monitoring problem, Dillon's Rule reduces monitoring costs of local residents (the principals of government officials) by
limiting the scope of what agents (local officials) can do. 10 6 When the
agents attempt to expand the scope of their activity, the fact that they
need to petition the legislature may signal residents that something out of
the ordinary is being considered, thus requiring enhanced monitoring.
Expenditures made to lobby the legislature may be the event that triggers
the signal to the populace, as these amounts are likely to be salient to
monitors (the press, citizen's "watchdogs," potential candidates for offices held by current agents).
C

The state legislature as a more pluralisticforum

Given my concern with one-sided lobbying and the capacity of dominant interest groups to provide unopposed rents to municipal officials,
the propriety of Dillon's Rule ultimately depends on whether the state
legislature is more likely than the locality to make decisions that are attentive to local residents' preferences. That conclusion, in turn, depends
on whether diverse views are likely to be made known to state legislators
104. See Ann Gellis, Mandatory Disclosurefor Municipal Securities. A Reevaluation, 36 BUFF. L.
REV. 15, 45-46 (1988); Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism and the Use of Municipal Bond Proceeds, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1030, 1063 (1983).
105. Gellis, supra note 104, at 45-46.
106. This argument was suggested to me by Joe Brodley.
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and whether those legislators are more or less likely than their local
counterparts to engage in rent-seeking from privileged groups. These
concerns cut in opposite directions. The more that decision making at
the state level is susceptible to inputs from various perspectives, the
greater the likelihood that decisions will be made after consideration of
all relevant interests. On the other hand, the more interests that are represented, the greater the ability of legislators to seek rents from high bidders. Certainly, even legislators who believe that the proposed activity
will benefit the locality without generating offsetting external costs have
reasons to withhold their votes in the expectation of receiving rents from
local interests, local officials, and other legislators who seek favorable
votes. The energies devoted to this process will increase the social waste
created by the Rule. Indeed, if Dillon's Rule were embodied in statute
rather than a rule of statutory construction, one might be tempted to
consider it as a prime example of legislative rent-seeking. That the judiciary has seen fit to confer this authority on the legislature need not detract from an investigation into whether it has generated the identical
effects. Thus, in this section I consider the relative opportunities of interest groups to influence state legislators and the opportunities of those
legislators to exact payment from the groups that form.
One-sided lobbying might be thought to be more prevalent at the
state level because, to be successful, interest groups are likely to require
financial resources beyond the reach of many local or ad hoc organizations. At the local level, a relatively small sum of money is likely to have
greater influence than a similar sum at the state level. This is true not
only because more state legislators than city councillors will have to be
contacted, but because the financial demands of the former are likely to
be much greater. A city councillor will need relatively few funds to sustain an effective election campaign, given the number and geographic
scope of constituents. Thus, the number of groups who can make a
"meaningful" contribution (sufficient to sustain the incumbent's attention) at the local level will be far greater than the number that can make
"meaningful" contributions at the state level. The group that seeks state
legislation may also have incurred substantial costs at the local level to
induce local officials to press the case at the state level. This "double
dip" increases the need for resources to wage a successful bid for or
against legislation, and hence limits the number of groups able to engage
in the process.
Nevertheless, there are competing reasons to believe that the state
legislature will be far less susceptible than its local counterpart to onesided lobbying. Simply as a geographical matter, the state is more likely
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to contain a variety of perspectives that may be represented throughout
the state but absent within any area within the state. Interests that are
latent at the local level (for lack of numbers, organization, or funds) may
be privileged at the state level or may attract an entrepreneurial leader
who would not have been available at the local level. Additionally, the
legislatures of most states are characterized by procedural safeguards
against one-sided lobbying that are not available at the local level. At the
state level, bills must survive a committee hearing, which may have no
counterpart at the local level. Legislatures in all but one state are bicameral, so that investments made in lobbying must be directed at a larger
and more geographically diffuse group of legislators. One effect of these
safeguards is to increase the costs of capturing a large number of decision
makers beyond the resources of groups that represent narrow interests.
These safeguards increase the costs of obtaining legislation and hence
serve to reduce the likelihood that any particular group will find pursuit
of its interests worthwhile. Moreover, a bill that appears to favor a particular interest group may more readily find opposition from an alternative branch of government at the state level, i.e., a strong executive, that
finds little analogue in any but the largest cities governed by mayors and
10 7
city councillors.
Moreover, the groups likely to be successful at the state level are not
necessarily the same as those likely to be successful at the local level. A
local developer or zoning attorney may have superior access to local officials because she is a repeat player with respect to those officials. But this
does not translate into an advantage at the state level, governed by a
different set of officials with whom the local partisan has little prior contact. Nor, if the developer or attorney anticipates continued concentration in local projects, is it worthwhile to develop the relationship
necessary to cultivate the statewide relationship. Certainly statewide organizations will exist, be they state bar associations or developer associations. But they are likely to concentrate on matters of statewide concern
beyond the ken of Dillon's Rule in the first place (as their statewide effects would render them inappropriate for local initiative), rather than on
parochial concerns of a particular locality.
It is difficult to determine which of these tendencies (towards onesided lobbying at the state or local level) dominates. The above consider107. These same procedures may, of course, be viewed as rent-seeking instruments rather than
safeguards. Committee members, for instance, may specialize for purposes of extracting payments
from those who seek approval of legislation. The increased costs that attend the process may eliminate from the debate some groups that could have participated in a less costly system and thus allow
more access by the survivors, who may represent narrow, but wealthier interests.
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ations, however, lead at least to the following conclusion. The higher
costs that attend lobbying at the state level likely mean that fewer groups
concerned with parochial issues will have a sufficient advantage to dominate at that level. Initially, this suggests that local issues will receive a
less biased hearing at that level, a vindication of Dillon's Rule. But this
same logic suggests that those groups with sufficient resources to sift
through to the state level are likely to be even more influential as they
will face less opposition than they would at the local level. What is unclear is whether the balance between quantity and ultimate effectiveness
nets out in favor of forcing localities to seek express authority from the
legislature for issues most susceptible to lobbying efforts.
D.

The capacity of judges

Even if judges play only a gatekeeper role in the administration of
Dillon's Rule, endorsement of that role constitutes a vote of confidence
in their ability to distinguish between cases in which salient interests are
excluded from the political process and cases in which they are not. After all, Early Estates itself demonstrates that judicial error is possible, if
not likely. Whether one opts for Dillon's Rule then, depends in part on
how prevalent one believes error will be. Collective action failures are
not necessarily so obvious that courts can be expected to recognize them.
Judges hostile to a particular ordinance may too readily see its passage as
the result of interest group pressures rather than the outcome of reasoned
debate among competitors. These issues are exacerbated by the possibility that judges, too, are susceptible to deviations from public good. They
may be captured by the mystique (as opposed to quality of legal argument) of particular law firms that appear before them. They may too
readily identify their own perception of the good with that of the public
at large. The issue, then, may become whether a false positive (deciding
that appropriate collective action has occurred when it has not) is less
important than false negatives (upholding ordinances passed in the face
of collective action failures). It may be that the latter type of error is
more serious because once it occurs (once the ordinance is passed), it is
difficult to undo. Dillon's Rule has the effect of favoring the false negative by beginning with a presumption that the failure has occurred.
VI.

SUMMARY

The argument to this point suggests that, taking intramural considerations alone, all residents of a locality would desire to enter into some
agreement to prevent any one of them from circumventing democratic
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debate about the allocation of scarce municipal resources. Only in this
manner could residents avoid competitive investment in rents to public
officials and deadweight losses that ultimately diminished the fair division of resources for all. Dillon's Rule has the effect of such an agreement, insofar as it prevents local officials from extracting rents in those
circumstances most susceptible to one-sided lobbying that circumvents
the political process. Novel municipal activities, those not generally permitted to all localities, may signal the successful attempt of a discrete
group within the municipality to capture the decision-making process.
Thus, a rule that requires some other entity to pass on the propriety of
the local decision serves as an effective means to distinguish those activities that are valuable experiments from those that cater to solitary bidders outside accepted channels of political debate. While any other level
of decision making may also be susceptible (judges or legislators may be
subject to their own biases and capacity for rent-seeking), the comparative costs are unclear. Thus, selection of a doctrine such as Dillon's Rule
cannot be considered inconsistent with attempts to induce decision-making in the public interest, and there is much to be said for its consistency
with that objective.
Regardless of how one resolves the tension about Dillon's Rule, attention to the capacity of local officials to circumvent constituent preferences makes some sense of the distinction between that Rule and the
relevant rule for private corporations. I have maintained above that the
relative power of public and private corporations cannot support the distinction in governing rules. I believe, however, that my analysis of Dillon's Rule suggests why the rules permitting private corporations greater
leeway than their public counterparts are appropriate. Those adversely
affected by the exercise of a new corporate power are likely to be shareholders who bought a stake in a particular venture at a particular level of
risk. 108 If the corporation seeks to engage in a riskier activity with which
the shareholder disagrees, investors have remedies not available to residents outside the Tiebout world. First, where shareholders are aware of
the risky activities, they have an ability to sell their shares, even if they
cannot effectively contest the activity. Exit costs, in short, are substantially below those available to municipal residents. Second, even where
shareholders are numerous (so that free riding on the monitoring of
others is possible), they are relatively (compared to residents) able to
108. Of course, corporate conduct may hurt nonowners, as where the corporation is engaged in
pollution or price gauging. But that behavior is not reached by rules of corporate governance. Instead, that behavior is restricted by tort law or antitrust law that is applicable even where the behavior was authorized by the corporation's internal processes.
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monitor the officials charged with administration of their investment.
Corporations generally pursue a single objective (profit maximization)
that is susceptible to measurement and analysis. Since public corporations (at least general purpose municipalities) serve multiple and interdependent functions, some of which are intrinsically immeasurable by a
single metric (e.g., is the school system providing an "adequate" education), it is difficult to determine how well they are doing at any one of
them.'°9 Should it appear appropriate on the above arguments that Dillon's Rule is an appropriate doctrine for analyzing the exercise of authority by localities, therefore, the corporate analogy should not serve as an
obstacle.
VII.

DILLON'S RULE AND POLITICAL MARKET FAILURES IN LOCAL

GOVERNMENT LAW

A.

The Impact Fee cases

What I have tried to establish above is that there may be reasons to
look askance at novel municipal activities, even when external effects of
the proposed activity appear to be minimal and there is no evidence of
official incompetence or corruption. Rather, the presumption embodied
in Dillon's Rule may be explained primarily as a reaction to the predictable response by local officials to pressures of a subgroup with particular
interests and access. 1 0 I am not claiming that courts have explicitly
adopted Dillon's Rule on this reasoning, nor necessarily that Judge Dillon explicitly embraced this theory."' My somewhat weaker claim is
that we can justify decisions in local government law on this basis, that
courts have intuited to doctrines that protect groups that are members of
the community but that are likely to be unrepresented in the local decision making process. Judicial intervention in these cases is appropriate
not because of concern for local imposition of external costs, but because
of intramural political process failures, sometimes generated by collective
action problems and sometimes generated by the push of raw
majorities. 112
I want to examine two sets of recent cases that test this hypothesis.
109. See JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION (1989); Cass, supra note 26.

110. See Gillette, supra note 104, at 1059.
111. But see supra note 96.
112. As Richard Briffault's remarks indicate, the problem of distinguishing appropriate majority
activity from inappropriate raw majoritarianism is a difficult one. In what follows I mean only to
suggest that courts have implicitly or explicitly attempted to address this conundrum in the context
of local government law doctrine. I refer the reader to Briffault's comments in this issue for further
elaboration. See Richard Briffault, Home Rule, Majority Rule, and Dillon's Rule, 67 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1011 (1991).
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The first deals with a relatively novel mechanism for raising local revenues that has come under the name of impact fee or linkage fee. Municipalities have sought to impose these fees in order to exact payments from
a subset of residents who seek some benefit from the municipality where
that benefit is alleged to impose an identifiable cost on all residents. The
function of the fee is to cause the beneficiary to pay the costs incurred as
a result of allowing it to engage in the preferred activity. Examples include requiring office building developers to provide on-site parking or
day-care facilities, or requiring developers of new residential areas to provide fees for road construction." 3 While this may be seen as a problem
of imposing externalities on nonresidents or future residents, there are
reasons to view the issue as one of intramural conflict. The fees are imposed directly on groups that frequently reside in or have some affiliation
with the locality, so that even if the ultimate payors of the fees are not yet
residents, the immediate payor may serve as a surrogate for their interests. Additionally, after the fee is imposed, the ultimate payors will constitute an identifiable group of residents, whether it be tenants on whom
linkage fees are imposed or homeowners in areas subject to an additional
road tax.
At first glance, such fees seem to satisfy both fairness and efficiency
norms that underlie public finance. To the extent that burdens imposed
are commensurate with benefits obtained, these fees do not offend elementary notions of fairness, particularly as the developments on which
impact fees are imposed (office buildings or developments for single-family housing) generally do not cater to disadvantaged groups or otherwise
raise issues of distributional equity. " 4 Indeed, to the extent that burdens
generated by these developments would otherwise be imposed on individuals who did not receive any benefit from the proposed activity, matching
costs to the actual beneficiaries is consistent with nonredistributional rationales based on fairness.
As an efficiency matter, imposing on the beneficiaries the costs of
their activity constitutes the traditional mechanism to internalize the adverse effects of conduct, thereby ensuring that the activity is limited to an
amount that returns total benefits in excess of social Costs.15 Thus, if
113. See, e.g., Russ Bldg. Partnership v. City & County of San Francisco, 234 Cal. Rptr. I (Cal.
Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 484 U.S. 909 (1987); New Jersey Builders Ass'n v. Mayor and Township
Comm., 528 A.2d 555 (N.J. 1987); Note, Municipal Development Exactions: The Rational Nexus
Test and the FederalConstitution, 102 HARV. L. REV. 992 (1989).
114. To the extent that the fees are disproportionate to the problem they purport to solve, they
are arguably both unfair and inefficient. See Call v. City of West Jordan, 614 P.2d 1257 (Utah
1980).
115. See Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitu-
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development of a high rise office building will cause substantial parking
problems in a downtown area, assessment of a fee on the developer,
passed on through rental charges to tenants, that is then used to construct parking lots may ensure an optimal balance between office and
parking facilities.
Given the capacity of impact fees to satisfy both fairness and efficiency concerns, it seems odd that a court would invalidate a fee imposed
on an intramural activity. Assuming a reasonable relationship between
the fee imposed and the cost that it is proposed to defray,' 16 any judicial
refusal to uphold such a fee would appear to constitute a mere substitution of judicial judgment about its propriety for a contrary legislative
one. Yet that is exactly what might be said about the current trend of
cases in which courts reject local efforts to impose such fees. While these
fees have been attacked on a variety of fronts, l17 the issue that appears to
have proven most troublesome to courts, and most successful for plaintiffs, is the authority of the municipality to impose them.
This issue of how broadly one can construe municipal power became
the central issue in two recent cases on impact fees: Kamhi v. York8 and Albany Area Builders Association v. Town of Guilderland.119
town 11
In the Kamhi case, the town of Yorktown desired to impose an impact
fee that would require developers either to set aside recreational land or
to make a money payment to the town. The court held that this recreation fee was unauthorized by either statutory or home rule provisions. In
a classic Dillon's Rule construction of implied powers, the court rejected
the claim that authority to impose the fee was inherent in statutory zoning or planning power granted to the municipality. The court concluded,
however, that the fee was permissible under the town's "supersession"
authority-the authority for the municipality to supersede state legislational Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 486-90 (1991) (exploring whether the costs of
exit provide a sufficient check on the capacity of localities to impose fees on developers); Clayton P.
Gillette & Thomas D. Hopkins, Federal User Fees: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 67 B.U. L. REV.
795, 805-13 (1987).
116. Several courts have required any impact fee to bear a rational relationship to the objectives
of the assessing government in fixing the charge. See, e.g., Downey v. Wells Sanitary Dist., 561 A.2d
174 (Me. 1989); Call v. City of West Jordan, 614 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1980); John J. Delany et al., The
Needs-Nexus Analysis. A Unified Test for Validating Subdivision Exactions, 50 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 139 (1987).
117. See, e.g, Downey v. Wells Sanitary Dist., 561 A.2d 174 (Me. 1989) (equal protection); St.
Johns County v. Northeast Fl. Builders Ass'n, 559 So. 2d 363 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1990) (state
constitutional provision ensuring free public schools); City of Key West v. R.L.J.S. Corp., 537 So. 2d
641 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (constitutional challenge); Hillis Homes, Inc. v. Snohomish County,
650 P. 2d 193 (1982) (impact fee invalidated as unauthorized tax under Dillon's Rule construction of
county taxing power).
118. 547 N.E.2d 346 (N.Y. 1989).
119. 546 N.E.2d 920 (N.Y. 1989).
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tion. Pursuant to this authority, the court said, the municipality had the
theoretical power to enact this impact fee as long as a "sufficient nexus"
existed between the property and the problem being redressed.120 Certainly, the court concluded, the fee at issue was one of "uniquely local
impact" and thus one to which the supersession authority applied. Furthermore, use of the supersession authority was appropriate to prevent
developers from escaping proper impact fees where state restrictions on
their use were inapposite. Nevertheless, the court found, the municipality had failed to jump through the procedural hoops necessary for the
exercise of supersession power. The municipality, for instance, had not
stated with sufficient "definiteness and explicitness" its intention to enact
law pursuant to its supersession authority. For this heinous omission,
the fee was invalidated in its entirety.
At first glance, this reasoning seems unduly formalistic. Certainly,
the court realized that they had invited the town simply to re-enact the
fee with the proper procedures. Yet this demand for formalistic adherence to process seems entirely in keeping with the concerns that I have
suggested underlie Dillon's Rule. A demand for attention to procedural
niceties reveals a judicial concern that the fee legislation be passed only
after appropriate signalling of the extraordinary nature of the proposal to
groups that might be adversely affected but that might otherwise not
seize opportunities to express their reservations. The case may vary from
those discussed above, because the group that dominates the local officials may constitute majority rather than minority interests. Nevertheless, the principle of one-sided lobbying remains the same. Minorities
may not be entitled to have their views adopted; they may, however, anticipate a process through which their views can be considered. The minority group (future residents) in Kamhi, however, may have been
particularly difficult to galvanize into collective action, given the members' current inability to identify themselves or each other (since they do
not yet reside in the affected area) or to monitor each other. By requiring
local legislatures to send a clear signal about the exceptional nature of
the activity they are about to undertake, the decision, consistent with the
function that I have indicated properly grounds Dillon's Rule, reduces
monitoring costs of groups potentially affected by eliminating the need to
examine all proposed local legislation. This reduction is crucial for
groups with weak links, since they are likely to be most susceptible to the
costs of coalition building and the problem of free riding. The result of
this forced signalling, therefore, is to reduce the probability that even a
120. 547 N.E.2d at 349.
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majority will be able to introduce local legislation that never comes to the
attention of a disadvantaged minority. This is not to say that the majority interests need to be rejected on that basis alone. It is only to suggest
that decisions that require more explicit statements of local authority,
consistent with Dillon's Rule, maximize opportunities for affected parties
to participate in the debate.
The Guilderland case sends a very similar type of signal, but one
that is even more exacting with respect to impact fees. The court in that
case was faced with a municipality's attempt to impose an impact fee for
transportation purposes. The fee at issue was to be paid by "applicants
for building permits who seek to make a change in land use that will
generate additional traffic," i.e., builders of developments, and was to be
used to fund off-site road improvements. The court held that the transportation fee was invalid because, even if authorized by statute or home
rule authority or supersession authority, any attempt to impose a transportation fee was preempted by substantial state legislation in the same
area. After recognizing that municipalities were entitled "to legislate in a
wide range of matters relating to local concern," the court indicated that
there was a compelling need for uniform, that is state-wide, applications
of highway fees; municipalities cannot be allowed to impose their own
highway fees and be unaccountable for the amounts collected in a manner not explicitly authorized by state law.
Even at first glance, this result appears quite odd. Why should it be
that the Town of Guilderland must have a highway collection system for
its town roads that is the same as the system of the City of Rochester? It
is difficult to fathom how something would be amiss if that kind of uniformity were missing. The court's stretching to this degree to strike
down the fee seems instead to reflect an ambivalence, if not outright animosity, to the very imposition of the impact fee. That animosity appears
appropriate once one considers whether the requested fee-intended to
defray costs for increased usage of town roads-was related to the prospective development. The municipal expenses of road maintenance and
repair might, in fact, increase with population. Nevertheless, if those
roads are to be used by all residents rather than (predominantly) by newcomers on whom the fee is to be imposed, can it truly be said that the
residents of the development are imposing a greater pro rata cost on the
town highway system than those who migrated to the town earlier and
are using the same system? If that is not the case, then why ought the
newcomers to be paying a disproportionately higher fee to maintain the
roads? In the absence of a more compelling justification, one is tempted
to read these exactions as an attempt to impose the costs of municipal
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improvements that will be enjoyed by all on a group uniquely disqualified
from opposing them: potential residents who are not yet capable of identifying or monitoring themselves, each other, or the extent of their interests. The absence, much less diffusion, of those adversely affected by the
ordinance suggests that the impact fee cases present an ideal case for the
type of capture that troubles public choice theorists.
This concern would be misplaced (or at least reduced) if absent future residents were represented by some other party currently before the
city council. For instance, a decision to increase local parking taxes that
fall disproportionately on commuters might pass the public choice test of
propriety if resident parking lot owners and businesses dependent on
commuter traffic had sufficient access to the city council considering the
measure.1 2 Developers and builders, however, do not necessarily provide good surrogates, especially in cases such as Yorktown and Guilderland. In towns with small numbers of development projects, the few
developers will not necessarily have sufficient access to the local legislature to provide representation commensurate with the number of potential fee payers. Even where developers are more numerous, their
interests may be more varied than that of landlords in Early Estates. Developers involved in new construction may oppose the plan, while those
who have already completed developments and wish to maximize rents
by keeping out competing developments may find attractive a financing
122
scheme that places additional costs on new units.
One can only take the argument about impact or linkage fees so far.
Recent cases permit these fees to be imposed in circumstances not unlike
2 3 Thus, one cannot
those in Kamhi and Guilderland.1
say that courts are
uniformly intuiting to the results mandated by the interpretation of Dillon's Rule offered here. What I believe one can say is that this interpretation is a valid one for understanding those cases in which Dillon's Rule
or some equivalent doctrine has been applied to prevent exercise of mu121. See City of Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369 (1974), which upheld just such a
tax against a due process challenge. Although the Court did not articulate this rationale for its
holding, the conclusion seems implicit in the Court's reasoning about the propriety of the taxation
process.
122. Of course, one could make the same type of argument in Early Estates if some landlords
who rented to low-income tenants had hot water already connected and others did not.
123. An impact fee was approved in Holmdel Builders Ass'n v. Township of Holmdel, 583 A.2d
277 (N.J. 1990). But the court based much of its rationale on the need to finance affordable housing
of the type involved in that case to fulfill its mandate from the Mount Laurel series of decisions. In a
context outside the affordable housing debate, the same court rejected a development fee on authority grounds. See New Jersey Builders Ass'n v. Mayor and Township Comm., 528 A.2d 555 (N.J.
1987).
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nicipal initiative where the decision making process is likely exclude systematically groups that are adversely affected by the decision.
B.

The non-delegation doctrine cases

Unlike its federal counterpart, the doctrine that a governmental entity may not delegate its public functions is alive and well at the state and
local level. Thus, a township could not delegate to a city the right to
approve plumbing services rendered within the township, even though
the entities shared a sewage system and disposal plant.1 24 Nor could a
municipality enact a zoning ordinance that made intramural regulations
1 25
subject to the approval of the state attorney general.
On its face, the non-delegation doctrine seems peculiar, at least
where the delegators are accountable to their constituents. A variety of
economies could explain the propriety of delegation from one locality to
another, or to private delegates. Economies of scale that justify substantial interlocal cooperation may be feasible only if one of the participating
localities is delegated final authority over decision making. Any alternative permits decision making only by unanimous vote of the participants,
a procedure that invites hold-out strategies and that can frustrate cooperation. Economies that result from experience may lead one locality to
employ another, or a private entity, to operate a program that the latter
has already successfully initiated. Economies in monitoring outputs
rather than inputs may augur for a principal-agent relationship instead of
an employer-employee one, and thus favor delegation of functions to an
t 26
entity outside the locality.

Given these economies, the non-delegation doctrine initially seems
to frustrate municipal efforts to take advantage of the expertise or experience of outsiders. Typically, the doctrine is explained as preventing
elected officials from abdicating responsibility in favor of parties with no
direct accountability to the electorate.1 27 Nevertheless, given the difficulty that directly accountable officials would have in performing all
tasks necessary to perform municipal functions, some level of delegation
124. Smith v. Spring Garden Township, 34 Pa. D. & C. 2d 54 (C.P. York Cty. 1964).
125. Thompson v. Smith, 129 A.2d 638 (Vt. 1957). This case seems somewhat apart from nondelegation decisions in which the delegate is from another entity, since the attorney general presumably represents all state citizens and thus is in a position to strike a decision that considers statewide
costs and benefits. Nevertheless, the court determined that the requirement of attorney general approval "would have the effect of redelegating power entrusted to the voters of the municipality to a
third person who was a stranger to the town, disconnected in any official way with the municipality
involved." Id. at 646.
126. See DONAHUE, supra note 109, Michael H. Schill, Privatizing Federal Low Income Housing

Assistance: The Case of Public Housing, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 878, 883-87 (1990).
127. See MICHELMAN & SANDALOW, supra note 11, at 802-03.
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is both necessary and appropriate. 28 The effect of the non-delegation
doctrine, strictly construed, would be to prevent localities from obtaining
assistance from those most qualified to assist in the performance of local
tasks.
The more appropriate issue under the non-delegation doctrine,
therefore, is the scope of impermissible delegation. Some hint of the
proper parameters of the doctrine appear in Vermont Departmentof Public Service v. Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Co., 129 where
the Vermont Supreme Court incorporated an analysis reminiscent of Dillon's Rule to resolve a non-delegation issue. In that case, the Vermont
court considered the validity of contracts for the supply of energy capacity between localities in that state and a public authority of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The authority ("MMWEC") was the partowner of a nuclear power plant whose escalating costs required the contracting localities to increase their payments beyond initial expectations.
The contract purported to obligate the Vermont municipalities to make
payments to the authority in respect of construction costs, even if the
power plant was never completed, operable, or operating. The Vermont
localities, however, were given no role in decisions affecting the costs of
construction or operation that served as the basis for the contractual payments. The Vermont participants could not even play an advisory committee role for registering discontent with the plans of the authority. The
court concluded that the contractual arrangements surrendered to the
Massachusetts authority
the sole power to establish budgets, revise those budgets, and fix the
amount of the participants' monthly payments. Further, the authority
to issue bonds resides in MMWEC alone, whether the bonds be for the
costs of plant construction, operation, termination, or of "renewals,
extraordinary repairs, replacements, modifications, additions and betterments. . . ." In sum, MMWEC makes all decisions to incur, or to
refrain from incurring, project debt. Hence, MMWEC is given exclumonthly payments
sive control over the magnitude of the participants'
30
and over the duration of these payments.'
It is not remarkable, therefore, that the court found that the localities
had delegated authority over the municipal spending power in excess of
their authority. 131
128. See Roehl v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1, 261 P.2d 92 (Wash. 1953).
129. 558 A.2d 215 (Vt. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 872 (1989).
130. Id. at 221.
131. Taken to its extreme, the court's statement of the non-delegation doctrine would preclude
most effective means of joint action by multiple localities. If one accepts the strong language of the
court ("[s]uch authority is in the nature of a public trust conferred upon the legislative body of the
corporation for the public benefit, and it cannot be exercised by others," id. at 220), it would appear
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Why would such a broad delegation have occurred? Once again, the
potential explanation lies in the capacity of delegates to obtain benefits
from local governments unopposed by adverse interests that have greater
difficulty overcoming obstacles to collective action. In the Vermont Public Service case, MMWEC had been able to convince officials of Vermont
municipalities to enter into contracts that-by virtue of the requirement
32
to pay without receipt of energy---essentially constituted a gamble.'
One can certainly understand MMWEC's incentives to enter into such
contracts. The security of this "take or pay" obligation allowed that authority to sell its bonds at relatively low interest rates without committing its own faith or credit to repayment. In theory, any argument made
to officials of the Vermont municipalities about the desirability or need
for the contracts (or for the underlying energy) would be met with questions by residents who would pay the electric utility bills, potentially
without receiving anything in return. Substantial obstacles, however,
seem likely to frustrate the organizational efforts of residents. Even substantial increases in utility bills would likely not offset the costs that any
individual would incur by lobbying local officials, investigating the probable costs of the project and probable increases in rates, or organizing
opposition to the project. As with the Chicken Game examples above,
individual efforts are even less warranted in this situation since similar
efforts by others would reduce the need for any individual to participate
without reducing the subsequent benefit to the nonparticipant. The nondelegation doctrine, therefore, imposes an offsetting obstacle on potential
delegates who have opportunities to convince local officials of the efficiency of their services isolated from the pressures of competing interests.
There may be instances where competition among potential delegates causes them to act as surrogates for residents, so that the concerns
that underlie the non-delegation doctrine are not triggered. Faced with
competition, potential delegates may appeal to local officials on the basis
that joint action by municipalities necessarily entails improper delegation unless all action is taken
by unanimous vote-a rule that would severely limit the possibility of cooperation among the participating localities. Unanimity would permit each locality to hold up the others in order to obtain
additional domestic benefits in return for the necessary favorable vote. An alternative interpretation
of the non-delegation doctrine would permit joint action to survive a non-delegation challenge so
long as each locality was entitled to participate in the decision making process, even if it were required to acquiesce in action approved by the majority with which it disagreed. Under one reading
of the Vermont court's rationale, however, municipalities in the minority would be considered to
have delegated their authority just as much as if it had been unable to cast any vote at all. Thus,
mere possession of a right to vote would arguably not satisfy the requirements of control and discretion that the Vermont Supreme Court considered essential to a finding of permissible delegation.
132. For a decision that a substantially similar contract was void on grounds of lack of authority, see Chemical Bank v. Washington Public Power Supply Sys., 666 P.2d 329 (Wash. 1983), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1075 (1985).
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of relative ability to represent the interests of others. Thus, delegation
may be more appropriate where it takes the form of contracting with
private firms that must compete for municipal business. A decision to let
a contract for municipal waste disposal, for instance, may be made only
after consideration of competing bids from private firms and hearing arguments from current municipal employees. In a case such as Vermont
Public Service, however, providers of the service (electrical energy) are
likely to be too small in number to generate the kind of competition that
reflects residents' interests. Nor, since payments come from individual
residents instead of the municipal budget, does the contract preclude local officials from using scarce municipal resources for other projects that
they favor. Thus, delegation of authority to determine rates permits local
officials to seek substantial rents from outside suppliers under conditions
that neither interfere substantially with other favors that officials may
wish to provide nor generate objection from any discrete body of constituents. For the same reasons, that decision is likely to be made by the
officials based on unopposed representations from the delegate and its
representatives. The effect of the non-delegation doctrine is to bar such
assignments of authority without intervention by state legislators who, in
this context, may have less ability to obtain rents or avoid fuller hearings
33
that invite the formation of competing interest groups.'
VIII.

CONCLUSION

I am reluctant to suggest any grand unifying theme that connects
all, or even much of an area as disparate as local government law. The
desire to prevent local governments from acting in areas uniquely susceptible to rent-seeking behavior, however, seems to be an appropriate objective for lawmaking and attempted entries by localities into novel areas
may indicate that rent-seeking opportunities have been seized. This interpretation is consistent with related doctrines that can be explained as
efforts to compensate for collective action failures. The case law suggests
that, in some groups of cases, courts may be intuiting to results consistent with that principle. Whether judicial direction of those cases to the
state legislature minimizes rent-seeking or simply increases it at a differ133. It may be noteworthy that, in the course of the MMWEC opinion, the court intimated that
delegation would have been permissible had it been legislatively authorized. See Vermont Public
Service, 558 A.2d at 220, 220 n.2, 223 n.3. This suggests that the court believed that a state forum
would be more receptive to expression of competing views, a belief that might have been particularly
appropriate where financing a nuclear power plant, distant from the contracting localities, was at
issue. Opponents of the plant might have had greater incentives to raise the contract issues before a
single forum, the state legislature, in hearings concerning the delegation power than they had to
intervene in multiple proceedings in localities of which they were not residents.
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ent level appears to vary with the type of program involved and its susceptibility to interest group formation at the state level. Notwithstanding
the difficulty of discerning the presence or absence of dominant interest
groups in any given situation, making that principle more explicit may be
a first step towards its refinement and application with greater certainty.

